Eritrea’s Worsening Image Problem on the Eve of UNSC Stiffening Sanctions

Eritrea's Worsening Image problem on the Eve of UNSC Stiffening Sanctions

Yosief Ghebrehiwet

The Eritrean regime has suddenly become image conscious. For an organization that has gone over its way to offend everyone and anyone that has come in contact with it, be it its own people or outside entities, this is indeed a miracle. There has to be an explanation for this late hour makeover attempt: pure, naked FEAR! But the problem for Isaias Afwerki and his PR guys like Yemane Ghebreab and Ali Abdu is that neither the charm offensives nor the clever ploys they have been conducting are working. They fail to realize that Eritrea has reached such an irredeemable stage that whatever it does to correct a former blunder could only be done through another blunder. Three recent futile cases could be mentioned as examples: the way the regime handled its soccer dilemma, the North African uprisings and the British detainees’ controversy.

Odd as it may seem, one could understand why the Eritrean regime wants to repair its image in the eyes of the world at a time when it finds itself hard pressed to explain its incorrigible terrorist misbehavior in the region; with the threat of stiffening sanctions by the UNSC (United Nations Security Council) looming large, its desperate makeover is but understandable. But what is surprising is that, given the utter contempt it has shown for its own people, this time around it seems also to be somewhat concerned about its image in the eyes of the Eritrean masses. But once we understand that it wants to convey two different images, the seeming discrepancy is resolved: while it wants to be seen as a law abiding nation in front of the world, it wants to be seen as strong, fully-in-control government in front of its people. Both images are, of course, motivated, by fear – in the former case, the fear of reprisal; in the latter case, the fear of an uprising.

The most memorable statement to come out of the Arab uprisings, one that is most relevant to the Eritrean condition, has been: “The fear is gone!” What these uprisings have shown is that the fear of the rising-up masses is inversely proportional to the fear of their pressing-down oppressors. If so, in the Eritrean case, if the people or any other elements within the regime (such as the military) are to rise up, they have first and foremost to detect fear in the eyes of the tyrant. That is why it is critical for the regime to convey the image of a strong government that is fully in control in matters that are both internal and external. With this show of unwarranted confidence, the regime aims at one goal: it wants its subjects, first and foremost, to fear it. And it clearly realizes that this atmosphere of fear cannot be sustained if the masses began to read fear in the eyes of their oppressors. But, to the great disappointment of Shaebia, what these recent controversies have shown is that the masses have began to see the fear in Shaebia’s eyes growing one controversy at a time, all in the dreaded anticipation of what may follow up the UN Monitoring Group’s report on its unrepentant misbehavior in the region.

Below, we will look at the Isaias regime’s three most recent scandals – the way the regime handled the North African uprisings, the British detainees’ controversy and the defection of its soccer players – each time coming out of its self-created dilemmas with a very negative image in the eyes of the world and its people. And, more importantly, we will see how each resolution that the tyrant has taken in these cases has been dictated by the naked fear that the dreaded end might be coming too soon. Given that these three scandals came right after another just before the UN decides on further sanctioning Eritrea gives this fear a special dimension and easily perceivable rationale – by the people.


Eritrea’s soccer dilemma

By now, all of you have must have heard the news: “Thirteen members of Eritrean football club Red Sea’s contingent defected in Dar es Salaam on Monday, hours after the conclusion of the Cecafa Kagame Castle Cup in which the team competed.” [1] Like a recurring dream, this nightmare is haunting the Isaias regime every time such regional tournament is conducted. The reason why this nightmare is persisting is that there is no solution to its dilemma: if the regime prevents its soccer team from traveling abroad, the nation’s image suffers; and if it lets the teams play in African games outside the nation, they invariably defect, and the nation’s image again suffers – damned if it does, damned if it doesn’t!

This latest bad news, coming as it does just a few days ahead of the critical UN meeting to assess Eritrea’s compliance with the sanctions imposed on it, is a big blow to the regime and its diaspora supporters who have been lately trying their best to polish its image in the eyes of the world. We know that the regime’s foot soldiers in diaspora, anticipating the worst, have been intimidating and coercing tens of thousands of Eritrean nationals into signing petitions against the sanctions – all done and said primarily with one point in mind: that the Eritrean masses love their government. What the latest defection in Tanzania does is prove just the opposite: that, given a chance, few would want to live in the hell-hole called Eritrea. Of course, the diaspora supporters of the regime know this first hand: not only are they unwilling to live in Eritrea themselves, but they have also been doing their hardest (with the rest of other Eritreans abroad) to get their beloved ones out of the grip of the totalitarian regime. The result is: the mass exodus of hundreds of thousands.

Isaias Afwerki’s quest for normality

Following the footsteps of former communist countries, Eritrea is determined to excel in sports. There is a simple reason for this: sport’s apolitical nature. Excelling in anything else that requires the mind to work is fraught with danger: higher learning, art, literature, journalism, entrepreneurship, etc. That is why when the nation is at its nadir when it comes to any kind of activity that requires intellectual input, we see it making some gains in running, bicycling and soccer. Sports have turned out to be the only way it could show the world that it is a normal nation. For a nation that is known for its abnormality in everything it does, this rare venue of normality is supposed to carry a lot of weight.

It is the same logic that the regime uses when it incessantly showcases its development projects – roads, micro dams, bridges, schools, clinics, etc – in EriTv and the rest of its mass media; only this time the normality it wants to display is primarily directed towards Eritreans, especially of the diaspora kind. Again, any other development, be it intellectual, humanitarian, social or political is seen as a threat to its hegemony, and hence to be totally avoided as a subject matter. Its “Warsai Yikealo Campaign” is the developmental equivalent to what sport is supposed to achieve in the cultural department. Be it in sports or in its development campaigns, Shaebia’s motto seems to be: “Let the muscles work, but leave the brain dead!” That is why the "iconic" image it wants to convey in its development campaign is engraved in a statue of a national service conscript carrying a big stone on his shoulder.

Despite its muscle enthusiasm, the problem for the regime has been that it cannot showcase its talent because of its irresolvable dilemma. Every time an Eritrean team had to play outside the country for a regional game, invariably some of the players defect. So far, this recurrent nightmare has happened four times – twice in 2006, once in 2009 and now. So what is to be done? Not in so the distant a past, the regime tried a radical solution to this problem.

It is to be remembered the last time an Eritrean soccer team (The Red Sea Camels), with a good winning record in the All African Game of 2011, was banned from traveling to Kenya for the fear that its players may defect: “When Eritrea beat Kenya 4-1 in a first leg All-Africa games qualifier, the whole country was in an uproar. ….However with two days before the return leg match, Eritrea has pulled out handing Kenya a place in the second round of the competition.” [2] It was indeed very odd to ban a winning team from traveling abroad to finish the tournament. Obviously, the despot was hoping that the Kenyan team would defeat the Eritrean team in Eritrean soil, thus saving him from further embarrassment – as was pointed out in an asmarino editorial [3]. This way, the nation would have come out of this tournament with its image intact: as a normal nation enthusiastically participating in a regional game, albeit one that honorably lost at the mid-tournament. But the despot was out of lack: not only did the Eritrean team beat the Kenya team, it did it big time: 4-1. When the regime was forced to resolve its dilemma in the oddest way possible, by withdrawing its winning team half-way from the tournament, the nation’s image suffered tremendously: its true totalitarian nature came out to be seen by the whole world loud and clear. So when another regional game came soon after, with the memory of this scandal still fresh in the mind of observers, the regime couldn’t use the same ruse it used before without being the laughing stock of the region.

In the All African Game of 2011, the ruse that the regime used to withdraw the winning Eritrean team in the middle of the tournament was: “The association claims they were informed late about the return date even though it was well known way before that the match would be played any day beginning from Friday April 29 to April 30 in accordance with the CAF calendar for international matches.” [4] Of course, the regime couldn’t use this flimsy and stupid excuse this time; not even its die-hard supporters would believe it. So, when the Cecafa Kagame Castle Cup tournament came, the only choice left to it was to let the team participate in the hosting nation, Tanzania, and risk another defection; but with all extra cautionary measures put in place: “To combat sports-related defections Eritrea’s government started to begin charging all traveling athletes a $6,700 deposit which is only returned if they do.” [5] But to no avail; after all, people are paying more than that to get the hell out of the nation, with the additional risk of being captured and sent to prison, kidnapped by human traffickers for ransom or shot at the border crossings. The huge monetary penalty though probably explains the return of the other 12 – they or their parents couldn’t afford to lose the deposit. In the end, Isaias couldn’t escape his dilemma: with 13 players defecting, the nation’s image suffered greatly. So, again: damned if he does, damned if he doesn’t!

The problem with the Eritrean government is that it fails to see that it wants to buy normality on the cheap. When all the choices that a government takes invariably lead it to a dead end, the problem is not with the choices themselves but with the nature of the government itself. What we have seen above is that whatever choices the regime takes to resolve its soccer dilemma, the nation always comes out with the wrong image. That tells us, with Shaebia at the helm, Eritrea will always be looked at as an abnormal nation

The British controversy dilemma

In the soccer case, we have seen that both the choices the regime was dealing with – whether to let the players participate in regional games or to ban them from traveling – didn’t offer a way out of its dilemma. The same is true with the choices it worked with in the British controversy: remaining stoically silent or garrulously explanatory didn’t offer a way out of its dilemma.

The farce that the Eritrean regime staged in its EriTv or Shabait.com (the written version) starts from the very beginning. In its introduction to the conspiracy theory it was about to weave on why it detained four Britons for six months without consular access, it said: “It is to be recalled that the Ministry in its press release of 8 April, 2011, noted that, on this issue, it refrained from delving into diplomatic, propaganda, press and PR campaigns, thus handling the matter with utmost prudence and patience, and that it would release detailed facts in due course.” [6] (emphasis mine) This kind of belated explanation sounds eerily similar to another farce it staged not long ago: the winded analysis (a series of articles under the title, Popular Uprising at Shabait.com) it gave on the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings a month too late.

In its announcement, the Ministry of Information provided this introduction to explain why there had been a total news blackout on the North African uprisings in the nation’s mass media for an entire month: “The enduring political culture and principle of the Eritrean government as regards such developments is to view matters from a wider context of regional and global events while exploring all historical dimensions that shed light on the complexity of the developments as well as potential scenarios so as to make analyses by gathering all the facts and intricate details” [7] After having roundly condemned the world media for having mishandled the reporting of the Mideast event, it went on to add, “The only practical and realistic approach in such cases is to patiently analyze the real picture.” (emphasis mine)

It is not coincidence that in both farces Shaebia’s “patience” comes out as the driving guide for the unjustified extended silence that preceded the explanations. But the true reasons were, of course, totally different. Both fictions were fabricated because the extended silences with which the regime reacted to these two big events were not only attracting negative attention, but were also starting to bear serious consequences. In the case of the North African uprisings, even its own foot soldiers were visibly uncomfortable with its silence, and were beginning to openly grumble as to why there was a total news blackout on the nation’s media for such a long time on such a momentous event in the region. In the case of the detained Britons, it was only after Britain began to flex its muscle that the regime rushed to concoct another fiction. Only when the British sanctioned the Eritrean embassy in London, prohibited it from collecting the illegal 2% tax and forewarned it of more to come did Shaebia lose its cool composure. Shaebia is an organization that prides itself for its “silence” (which it considers to be very cool, irrespective of the context), and hence is always caught off guard when its silence becomes too loud to be ignored. Once alerted of its silent notoriety, nobody would stop the garrulousness with which it wants to make up for its past silence on the subject matter: either it is a long series of articles or a TV docudrama; nothing less would do. The lesson is: whenever Shaebia loses its cool composure (as of “a man of few words”) and begins to blubber big time, it is always to cover up its fear of what might follow up the blunder that has, in the first place, motivated the silence.

But it would be wrong to assume that the grand spectacle enacted in EriTv was directed at the British. Even though it is the response of the British government that triggered the first fear, the release of the detainees without the drama that followed it would have been enough to stop the British threat. So when it comes to dealing with the first fear that the British reaction triggered, the drama was totally superfluous.

What necessitated the enactment of the drama was an entirely different kind of fear that came from the realization that it had no choice but to set the detainees free. This second fear had entirely to do with the Eritrean masses: the fear that the masses would know the actual reason why the regime was setting the detainees free. The authorities are keenly aware that the moment the public detects fear in their eyes that will be the moment of their vulnerability, for it will embolden them to rise up against Shaebia. And it was precisely to cover this detection that a grand show of bravado was enacted in EriTv, necessarily followed by their giving in to the demands of the powerful.

The nature of the dilemmas that the regime was faced with during the North African uprisings and the British detainees’ controversy remain the same. In both instances, the choices the regime gave itself were either complete and extended silence or its exact opposite, a very long explanation. But do not let the difference confuse us, since both reactions were motivated by the same drive: to provide the Eritrean masses with an image of a confident government fully in charge of its affairs. The deafening silence with which it dealt the two crises was meant to show the public that even tectonic uprisings in the neighborhood or serious confrontations with powerful nations like Britain do not unhinge the silent composure of stoic Shaebia. But once the silent composure became too expensive to maintain because of the imminent threats it engendered, the very long explanation that followed up the silence with was meant to cover Shaebia’s moment of weakness: the loss of its silent composure – the fear in its eyes!

Conclusion: the link between the internal and external

We have been looking at two kinds of fear that are motivating the Eritrean regime to polish its image: the fear of reprisal from the outside world and the fear of an uprising from its people. But these two needn’t be seen exclusive of one another.

To the world, it wants to convey the image of a normal nation, and the only way it could that is through sports – supposedly an apolitical venue. But given the negative attention every sport event it participates outside the country is attracting, the regime is belatedly finding out that there is no such thing as a politically neutral venue when it comes to totalitarian entities like itself. It wants to use a domestic talent to polish its international image, but those soccer players not only come out with all their talents but also with all their grievances. The stupidity of the regime lays in its attempt to hold these two apart of one another.

In the other two scandals (the way the regime handled the North African uprisings and the British detainees’ controversy), we have seen what the regime fears most is the day the masses will detect naked fear in its eyes. And in both instances (as in the case of the soccer scandal), these fears arose not in dealing with its people directly, but in dealing with the outside world. And that is where the key lays: only when pressure comes from outside is the regime thrown into the kinds of dilemmas we have seen above. And if these small incidents have easily cornered it, imagine what a bigger confrontation would do to it. That is why the stiffening of sanctions by the UNSC, as recommended by IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development), is very much needed at this moment. If it happens, the masses will unambiguously read naked fear in Shaebia’s eyes. If the masses or the colonels are ever to rebel, this will indeed be the moment. Whether they will need extra pressure from the outside will depend on how stiff the sanctions will be.

These latest scandals, coming as they have done on the eve of a hefty UN Monitoring Report, undoubtedly cataloging a long list of its misadventures in the region, has exacerbated the already damaged image of the nation. What the Shaebia foot soldiers are finding out is that no amount of lipstick lavished on the Shaebia pig will ever work; their organization is beyond redemption. Let’s hope that, this time around, Shaebia gets what it deserves

Footnotes

[1] “Red Sea players defect in Dar”, Daily Nation, July 11, 2011:Daily Nation: - Football |Red Sea players defect in Dar

[2] “Kenya U23 handed a lifeline as Eritrea withdraws”, Sports News Arena, April 20, 2011: soccer: Kenya's U23 handed a lifeline as Eritrea withdraws

[3] “President Isaias Afwerki Bars Eritrean Winning Soccer Team from Traveling to Kenya”, asmarino.com, May 04, 2011: President Isaias Afwerki Bars Winning Eritrean Soccer Team from Traveling to Kenya

[4] “Kenya U23 handed a lifeline as Eritrea withdraws”, Sports News Arena, April 20, 2011.

[5] “Eritrean footballers go missing (again)”, Global Post. July 12, 2011: Eritrean footballers go missing (again)

[6] [1] Press Release. Shabait.com; June 08, 2011: PRESS RELEASE

[7] Announcement. Shabait.com; 22 Feb, 2011: Announcement

Yosief Ghebrehiwet
07/14/2011