Ethiopia’s War Threat against Eritrea: a Bluff, says Journalist Eskinder Nega

Eskinder Nega describes recent anti-Eritrea war threats by Premier Meles Zenawi as a bluff. In an article posted on Nazret.com on March 26, 2011, he says Ethiopia is not ready to fight because of “vivid Eritrean air superiority”. The writer also thinks President Isaias Afewerki is the best for Eritrean stability in the face of the “danger of political Islam” in the country. Moreover, the writer thinks Isaias may initiate war over Badme as the issue is a matter of “national priority for him”. Eskinder sums up his analysis with a warning of his own against the Eritrean government: “Beware”, he says, “Ethiopians are more united than they are usually given credit for. Don’t provoke them.”

Eskinder is entitled to his own views and hopefully he will continue to express them freely from his base in Ethiopia. I wish President Isaias would allow me to do the same out of Eritrea.

The degree of freedom Eskinder seems to enjoy in articulating his ideas is quite refreshing. He is of course writing as an activist, not a journalist. And as such he is not expected to engage in straight reporting without revealing too much of his own political conviction, and instead encourage the reader to draw her/his own conclusions. Such journalism is fast disappearing in the Internet era. There is too much editorializing and not enough investigative writing. We are all guilty of this as journalists in one way or the other. Nowadays, little or no editing is done to whatever is posted in the Internet. I used to enjoy editing and being edited.

Eskinder’s wild speculation regarding Meles’s threatening statement about ‘Eritrean regime change’ seems to be based on poorly researched Wikipedia facts. The writer’s core point of argument is that Meles may wish to attack Eritrea but could lose mainly because of Eritrea’s air superiority with 100 fighter aircraft compared to 55 for Ethiopia. To be sure, Eskinder did bring in other factors such as Ethiopia’s much larger economy and population size which can tip the balance of power against Eritrea especially in a protracted war.

It is possible that the Wikipedia information is true although the website strongly warns that any of its articles are subject to editing and changing by any unknown third parties. Eskinder therefore has the responsibility to inform his readers about the website’s disclaimer which reads: “Wikipedia cannot guarantee the validity of the information found here. The content of any given article may recently have been changed, vandalized or altered by someone whose opinion does not correspond with the state of knowledge in the relevant fields.”

Pointing to the need for further research, Wikipedia guides the reader to look at two sources, namely, Milavia and Scramble, which, though not up-to-date, appear more credible in their assessment of Eritrean-Ethiopian air force capabilities. The links are respectively: http://www.milavia.net/aircraft/su-27/su-27_operators.htm#eri and http://www.scramble.nl/er.htm. According to these sources, Eritrea has a total of approx 34 fighter planes. These include about 8 Su-27s, 8 Su-25s, 4 MiG-17s, and roughly 14 MiG-29s. It seems most of these planes were ordered and delivered in the wake of the outbreak of the war between the two countries in 1998. As of 2011, Milavia and Scramble provide no new data on the number of fighter planes in the hands of either Eritrea or Ethiopia. While Milavia’s data on Ethiopia is old and incomplete, Scramble carries no information on that country’s air force. Obviously more study is needed.

Keeping the controversial Wikipedia data aside, it was astonishing that Eskinder called Meles’s warning against the Eritrean rulers as a ploy aimed to divert attention from internal, political pressures in Ethiopia. Meles may face demands for political reforms, but his calculated statement to bring about regime change in Eritrea by “all means necessary” cannot be written off as inconsequential. Whether Melese’s new policy will include direct military intervention or whether Ethiopia will only arm Eritrean opposition forces is beside the point.

The Eritrean government, already reeling under harsh UN sanctions, decided to take the Ethiopian threat at face value. It was quick to denounce Meles’s threat to “oust the Eritrean regime”. On March 25, 2011, Eritrea called on the UN Security Council to condemn Ethiopia’s intentions to use force to oust Isaias.

However, Eskinder is right to point out that Badme is the number one issue for Isaias. Or is it? Meles thinks it isn’t or shouldn’t. He told an Eritrean opposition radio station last month that Ethiopia was ready to pull out of Badme in exchange for guarantees from Eritrea for peace and normalization of relations. It is hard to see how serious each side is about a quick Badme solution. Eskinder and other Ethiopian thinkers would know better as to what really is stopping Meles from giving up Badme and demarcating the border pursuant to a UN ruling.

It is equally hard for Eritreans to pin down Isaias’s intentions over the Badme issue. But it is thought that he may not yet be ready for an Ethiopian withdrawal and a demarcation. He has repeatedly blamed Badme for his failure to build democratic institutions in Eritrea. But given his authoritarian domestic policy record, it is impossible to imagine that once the border issue is resolved to his satisfaction, Isaias would automatically allow such rights as rule of law, freedoms of speech and conscience. He has up to 300, 000 restive conscripts consigned to the countryside on account of Badme. If they were to be demobilized now, the question of rehabilitation will cause a serious threat to Isaias’s rule.

Ex-soldiers are bound to be demanding jobs, education, housing etc., which the government cannot afford as gold mining profits are not due before 2013 and self-reliant Isaias may not want to take foreign aid in the interim. Jobless war veterans roaming in Eritrean cities and towns will certainly rock the boat leading to revolutionary economic and political changes.

If Meles is really serious, here is his best chance to effect “regime change” in Eritrea by pulling the rug from under Isaias’s feet right away. It would of course mean formalizing an end to Ethiopia’s control of Badme and having the UN demarcate the border. This revolutionary plan for regime change would cost Ethiopia not a single drop of blood or a single penny. Eritrea and Ethiopia will then live happily ever after. In short, Isaias will not survive a sudden peace deal with Ethiopia. It is unlikely he will move swiftly enough to satisfy the political and economic demands of the tens of thousands of demobilized Eritreans who have fulfilled their national duties to the full. With the “Ethiopia threat” removed from the minds of Eritreans, people would focus on democratization, which Isaias says won’t happen in 30 to 40 years.

Unlike Eskinder’s misguided proposition, Eritrea does not need Isaias’ "strong hand" for national stability because of what he calls the “danger from political Islam”. First, it is much better if it is left for the Eritreans to decide who the best leader is for them. Secondly, there is no evidence of political Islam challenging the future of a secular democracy in Eritrea. And if it ever exists, dictatorship is never the answer.

Beware:  I am urgently calling for a debate at Badme between Meles and Isaias with me as the moderator. I have moderated many political debates over radio and TV in the past and I can be exceptionally fair and balanced.

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