Eritrea: the Rashaida Bedouin’s Independence that Outlasted the Rest

 In the popular Amharic novel, Oromai, one of the best books that chronicled Mengistu’s major military campaign to defeat the EPLF, a small observation but of a significant importance was included about the Rashaida. While in the theater of operations, the army met a group of pastoralist Rashaida clans, but remarkably nothing of a cruel nature happened to them. The commander, the hero character, briefly describes to the reader their culture and customs and, most importantly, their alleged gift of a sword to none other than to the chairman of the Derg.

If the army had met other tribes, who traditionally live in the place or other parts of Eritrea in the heat of battle, there was a high probability that they would be either gravely mistreated or killed in cold blood for supposed collaboration with the insurgents. What then explains the extreme preferential treatment given to the Rashaida by the military regime? Certainly, they were not an exception. The Kunama tribe, who throughout the armed struggle fought against the Eritrean nationalist war, considering it a threat to their identity, culture and not least their resources, was in the eyes of the Derg above suspicion and threat.  The Rashaida, on the other hand, neither fought for ghedli nor did they ally with the Ethiopian army; instead, they kept themselves “invisible” and “absent” for the duration of the conflict. A caveat is needed here: establishing this fact must not be construed as an attempt to malign this tribe for not embracing the nationalist cause. If, however, the essay helps people question the existence of “supra-ethnic nationalism” [1], as claimed in one study, stating that the nine ethno-linguistic groups in Eritrea have both tribal and civic identity at the same time, there is no objection.

The thesis stated that, “Eritrea is a model of a civic nation” [2] completely ignoring the resolute unwillingness of the Rashaida Arabs to transcend their “primordial based identity” and to embrace the nationalist war, and the Kunamas, the Afars, and the Tigrigna-Qohayin who persistently fought against it. Let alone to participate and fight for a nationalist cause, the Rashaida had little or no social contact with the indigenous tribes such as the Tigres. For example, marriage with other tribes has always been forbidden among this tribe. Yet, political expediency made it necessary to bestow the sense of Eritrean nationhood to the vanquished Kunama, and the absentee Rashaida in equal terms. In the war’s aftermath, while the Kunama community’s existence has been in dire stress, the Rashaida’s appears vibrant and strong.

This policy of “absence” or refusal to partake in the ghedli’s program was instrumental in keeping the Rashaida community safe from the ravages of war. If the same policy or even something less strong was attempted by any of the other tribes in Eritrea, the punishment was severe and swift. A peasant who refuses to provide food, draught animals and himself or his children would be punished severely, and in many instances would be arrested and taken to disappear altogether. Although the Rashaida have lived in the country for almost a century, the fronts’ operators treated them as if they were subjects of another nation with no obligation to the nationalist war.

A strange coexistence

Research on small-scale communities and particularly on the Rashaida is scant in Eritrea. The Rashaida are relatively newcomers to the region, they migrated from Saudi Arabia to the northern enclave of the Sahel around 1860, which though nominally belonging to the Ottoman Empire was nonetheless administered by Egypt. Arid, and sparsely populated, but with shallow waters for easy sailing to the other end of the Red Sea, this sliver of the empire between Sawakin and Massawa was an ideal place for a community that wants to keep its distance from the central authorities. [3]

The Rashaida, while mainly nomadic-pastoralists, were also involved in illicit trade such as guns and slaves. These were lucrative commodities in the 19th century. The coming and eclipsing of different empires had interrupted and disturbed the livelihood of other tribes in the region to some extent. The same forces, however, remarkably failed to capture and penetrate the culture and institutions of the Rashaidas. Not even the appearance of the disparate armed groups that emerged into the scene about one century later and the finally unchallenged power of the EPLF resulted in any adverse impact on their autonomy. This state of affairs was an anomaly.

Public space

On this website, a few of us have repeatedly asserted the totalitarian nature of the current regime in Eritrea and its old organization the EPLF. Such a blanket statement, when applied to “governance” of the Rashaida under the EPLF, quickly collapses and fails to explain the power relation between the armed groups and the fiercely independent community. How so? Well, this tribe had successfully resisted the manipulation and raw force of various colonizers and nation states, and it equally withered the might of ghedli. There was no slim of a chance under the notorious EPLF, which had ruthlessly been treating the rest of the population groups with military discipline, including the people in the highlands located far from its base area. Yet, the Rasahida kept their autonomy.

What underlines their condition, which stood against the prevailing orthodoxy of totalitarianism, as argued by a few writers in this website? What rationale defines their “de-facto independence in Eritrea?” [4] “Their frontier-zone location”, [5] their habit of carrying arms, hidden or otherwise, and their propensity to move across poorly monitored borders may partly explain the mystery behind the long maintained autonomy, but is not conclusive enough. This paper will attempt to canvass some of them.

Jebha’s pro-Arab identity

The way the Rashaidas live in the western bank of the Red Sea in the Sahel areas leaves the impression that they are still in the opposite bank. Their sense of confidence, and composure are easy to notice by any observer. Their neighbors, the Hababs of Sahel, who had been living in the region for ages were not as lucky as they were. Though their link with central authorities was weak, they were not always secure from its intermittent intrusions. Nor were they totally immune from the administration and demands of the ELF, which shared their domicile until it was evicted by its rival. The agro-pastoralists had to endure the levy made on them such as food and draft animals. How did the Rashaida manage to extricate their tribe from the all-pervasive control of the ghedli then? Jebha’s strong affiliation with the Arab identity and cause was among other factors the crucial atmosphere that kept the Rasahida protected and sheltered from the all-pervasive presence of war. Their fortune did not reverse even when some years later the EPLF made its presence, and rallied people under anti-Arab platform.

EPLF’s anti-Arab identity

Although the nature and origin of the conflict between Jebha and the EPLF are many and complex, policy differences on identity and affiliation with the Arab world had their role. If it had contributed to the bitter civil war between both fronts, their supporters and in many cases the loss of lives and property of many innocents, it did not subsequently affect the Rashaida Arabs, whose identity with their ancestral land was solid and strong. Under ordinary circumstances in Africa, where institutions are weak such policy could have quickly led to mass killings and predatory activities on the tribe, which refused to do the “pledge of allegiance” to the war of liberation. Unusual to the practice of the EPLF, which has always been inimical to any tribe that resists mobilization, the Rashaidas were largely left alone. That was not all. The anti-Arab policy that was also in varying degrees shared by successive Ethiopian regimes did not result in any major repercussion on the said community.

The Emperor’s cold war with the Arabs

In the sixties, although Jebha’s growing military activities was felt by the monarchy, ELF’s aircraft hijacking activities in mostly the airports of Muslim nations was by far the biggest factor that triggered the conflict with some of the Arab states. Worried about the publicity that accompanied the acts, the regime launched a propaganda campaign on Syria and others. It also attempted to radicalize the domestic politics. In Asmera, several hundred people from the kebabi, workers and many from dignitaries from the city were in one instance summoned for a gathering. Ras Asrate Kassa, the governor of the Eritrean province, who made a speech on the worsening relations, addressed the crowd.

This event had an injurious effect on the enterprising community of Yemeni merchants and their brethren in the haulage business. The flight of the Yemeni businesspersons since those years may have been facilitated by the hostile atmosphere that ensued. The repercussion from the policy that affected the urbanite Yemenis did not happen to their fellow Arabs, the Rasahaida pastoralists, who were safely distanced in the inhospitable Sahel corner.

Similarly, life under the Derg, which was increasingly getting hostile to what it disparagingly called Petro-dollar states, did not seem to affect them negatively. Not even, when their traditional home was embroiled in the several werars launched by the Ethiopian government. The Derg, having mellowed its anti-Arab rhetoric in its later years, bestowed the status of an Arab nationality within Socialist Ethiopia to the Rashaida tribe. [6] In sum, the contrarian policy of the contending groups on the Arab states did not seem to affect the welfare of the openly Arab Rashaida community.

Out of the loop

In Africa, the hegemonic role of an ethnic group be it a majority or not is always facilitated with the aid of the state. The losing groups remain excluded from the political space, the profitable economic activities, and feel alienated from the nation-state. This phenomenon strongly manifested itself in West Africa. The weak link with the rural areas produced a sheltered atmosphere for various rebel armies, that deceptively introduced themselves as their “boys”. The marginalized population groups were to be disappointed again when the rag-tag armies caused havoc and mass murder among them. As a result, some West African nations are still reeling from the mayhem.

In Eritrea, however, the Rashaida were singularly able to curve a public space and a sheltered environment in the midst of the huge wars that consumed the lives of many combatants, and ghebar alike. They maintained their cherished autonomy that was challenged repeatedly by various colonial and post-colonial regimes in western side of the Red Sea. Their circumstance is unique. Other tribes, who were forcibly taken to the eastern bank had been in bondage, and are still considered as second-class citizens – for instance, the blacks in Saudi Arabia and the Tihama plain in Yemen.

For most of their history in the region, they were able to manage their affairs without impunity, and in some instances did not hesitate from “sabotaging” the fronts. They used to smuggle countless draft dodgers for money during the ghedli times, an offense that is considered a major crime and often exacts a heavy punishment. If, in rare circumstances, they cannot avoid request for services from the fronts, compensation is negotiated on equal terms. Their tents, unlike the hidmos and agudos of the kebessa were also not searched or violated. The subaltern status of the rest of the ghebar in Eritrea did not apply to them.

Power without Yikealo

South of the Rashaida territory, an autonomous and vibrant urban community had been in existence in Massawa. Contrary to the Rashaida’s mode of life, commerce and trade in the city required stability, and some degree of law and order. Life also necessitated the mingling of diverse races that hailed from places such as India, Yemen, Egypt, and Ethiopia. Having studied the harmony and the vibrant trade-exchange in the city, a certain author arrived at the concept of “Red Sea Society”. [6] Despite the flows and ebbs in its history, the Massawa community survived until the late years of the nationalist war, when the majority of the indigenous inhabitants scattered all over the region.

In contrast, the havoc and insecurity of the war times appear to have not touched their Rashaida compatriots. In a region that underwent many massacres, there is not a single carnage that befell the Rasahida community. In other words, the Rashaida were possibly the single community that could not fulfill the category of a war-torn-society in Eritrea. Resilient and strong they have yet to succumb to the whims of the state, and are adapting themselves to challenges of contraband in the age of globalization.

Old habits

The EPLF and the regime that followed it have something important in common: the propensity to venture into smuggling and illicit trade. The current regime and the Rashaidas both abhor the border of the nation state (the border of other nations in the case of the government.) The irony is that while the Rashaida do this business mostly in the frontier zones, and usually eluding the nation-states, the EPLF, after having fought for the nation-state, is still immersed in such trade. The most evil aspect of their practice is, however, the complete disregard for the life of people, whom they have been treating as serfs, in the regime’s case, and inhumane treatment of people fleeing the regime by some of the Rashaida community.

The regime and the EPLF that have always been averse to the private sector are nonetheless comfortable doing business with the latter tribe directly or otherwise. While the cross border smuggling of goods from the Sudan is done with the blessing of the regime, the trafficking in people is not unbeknownst to the same.  In order to buttress this point, a glance into the region’s past is necessary. Massawa was the depot for slaves until the mid 19 century, but to a lesser degree, the Rashaida territories in northern Sahel were also involved in the bi-directional trade of guns and slaves between the Red Sea.

In recent times, there are increasing numbers of reports about the egregious behavior of some Rashaida clans in human trafficking. Hefty sums of money are demanded as a ransom from the hapless refugees, who embarked the voyage to Israel. This epitomizes the mockery in the nation state that ended as Eritrea: in its ending as a penal place internally, while also providing countless of its subjects fleeing from its clutches into the hands of some of the Rashaida community and other opportunistic entities.

This is a testament to the superficiality of the “sovereignty” of the country that made its people vulnerable and prey and to the claim of “harmony” in Eritrea advanced by various border-guard scholars. The irony of all is witnessing the inhumane treatment of the hundreds of the hostages, whose fathers and brothers/sisters had fought and made the nation-state of Eritrea happen. Without doubt the minimum requirements of what “patriotism” asks is absent from some of the Rashaida community let alone the characteristics of an alleged civic nation.

Conclusion

The state that tramples its subjects ruthlessly treats the Rashaida with care and respect. When the circumstance allow it does also illicit business with them such as cross border smuggling particularly from the Sudan. That is not all. In a country, where the armed struggle is considered as a national pride, and people who did not participate are considered as outcasts, the Rashaida had obtained a waiver. “They opted to remain in a single ‘tribe,’ and to do so continue to cross back and forth across the international boundary that nominally divides them between Sudan and Eritrea”, observed one writer. [7]

“They refuse to be co-opted or absorbed by the larger societies that surround them. And neither Sudan nor Eritrea has the political will or power to compel them to accept exclusive citizenship in either country” wrote Young in his seminal study on the Rasahida. [8] The Rashaida achieved all this without even walling themselves in as the Hararis in southeast Ethiopia, whose ancestors also hailed from Yemen. Alas, this Wall did not prevent the Arab blood from mixing with the locales’.

If the fortune of politics has been kind to the Rashaida Arabs, the Tekurir, who inhabit the western border with the Sudan, and the African Kunama who lost the war against the nationalism, find themselves at the bottom of the heap. Their patriotism under suspect, they remain blamed for an alleged robbery in the aftermath of Om-Hajer massacre in the mid 70s and the recent military debacle with Ethiopia.

Yet, the public and foreigners in general have been feted with the exotic culture of the Rashaida for a long period, completely glossing over their absence in the long war of nation making and its meaning of citizenship. They refuse to delve into the mind of the community that chose to remain distinct, and with minimal intercourse with the local tribes, who are after all Muslims. They equally refuse to ask why the local tribes such as the Tigre and Tigrigna speakers have been deferent to the Rashaida, but intolerant and hostile to the non-Arab tribes of the Kunama and the Tekurir.

Why the double standard? The ferocity and militancy to stamp out any signs of disloyalty carried on the Kunamas and others were not matched with the hand-in-glove treatment of the Rashaida Arabs. Is it because the people suffer from an inferiority complex towards the Arabs, whose hegemony manifested itself under the Egyptian empire of the 19th century? A state of malaise not dissimilar to how the same public perceived the whites, whose power projected itself under the Italian Empire until the mid 20th century. The variegating policies of the fronts and the various Ethiopian regimes’ towards the Arab nations indicated above notwithstanding the answer may lie in the deep recess of our psyche.

In summation, this article suggests to other writers not to limit themselves to the broad kebessa-metahit fissure, and instead to inspect the trajectory of the micro-communities that were either conveniently forgotten or denied their voice.

1. Bereketeab, Redie. Supra-Ethnic Nationalism: The Case of Ertirea
2. Ibid.
3 Young, William C. The Rashyida Arabs vs. the State: The impact of European Colonialism on a Small-Scale Society in Sudan and Eritrea.
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
6. Miran, Jonathan. Red Sea Citizens: Cosmopolitan Society and Cultural Change in Massawa, p.6.
7. Ibid
8. Ibid