Mass Uprising Deficit in Post-Liberation Societies: the Eritrean Case

The “Arab Spring” has, according to some political pundits, sprung in North Africa and parts of the Middle East at last. It is an extraordinary time that is still witnessing the fall of mostly authoritarian military regimes and the anxiety of a few monarchs. Good riddance with all of them! This writer says it with some reservation, however. Vicious and corrupt as they were, some had a growing economy, a well educated middle class and a relatively open society. In comparison with the regime in Eritrea, the authoritarian states of Arab North Africa, with the exception of Algeria, are less benign and totalitarian.
 
The lightening public upheaval and the sudden debacle of the governments has among other factors also to do with a citizenry that was spared a long war and the shock and trauma that accompany a long “liberation war”. Aside in Algeria, such a phenomenon did not happen elsewhere in North Africa. Trampled as they were, and without dignity, they were nonetheless angry people biding their time. In contrast, the public mood in Eritrea has been infused with exhaustion, resignation and the urge to flee the land. Not even our own Tunisian version, Djibouti, whose inhabitants defiantly called for the removal of the head of state several days back seems to embarrass them. The trauma from “liberation” has left its indelible imprint on them.
 
The sense of “taking back” a country, a phrase frequently expressed by Arab protesters is very dissimilar to the familiar cry of revolutionaries for a future “paradise” in the last century. The “past” is not completely smeared. There is a sense of loss not completely eradicated by the praetorian Egyptian regime that emerged fifty years ago. This kind of mood has not been discerned in our corner of the world. Not even the vision of a future articulated by the opposition has impressed them yet. What would budge the hunchback-like creatures in Eritrea who have lost their dignity and have been walking with lowered head despite having become citizens of a new nation? A complete rejection of the farcical ghedli tsegatat and its substitution with their time-honored traditions and customs and the complete reversal of the “modernization” made in its image could be one.
 
What has transpired in the beleaguered Arab nations may also happen in Eritrea, but without something that resembles the “Arab Street”, and not from being outraged by particular acts of the government, for the public in Eritrea is inured to it. Without the cataclysmic and shocking effect of military or economic nature or both to serve as a major catalyst, the streets in Asmera or Keren will likely remain as only passegiata or promenade places. This assessment may be considered unfair and unpatriotic, but a careful reading of Alena’s 19th installment will sober the minds of those who consider themselves as iron-willed nationalists. It laments the absence of public upheaval. This is not the stuff you expect from a confident alewuna alewana corner.
 
The testimony of a political actor from another vantage point is also quite telling. In comparison to our own, Museveni, the benevolent-like dictator dismissed the likelihood of a civil unrest in Uganda in a recent BBC interview as something that cannot happen in “liberated” societies. He attributed the crisis to what he strangely termed “office” countries. If they do, he further said, “We will lock them up.” The good colonel is implying that his subjects are contented, and inadvertently alluding that the authoritarian regimes of Tunisia and Egypt do not have the stamina required to suppress a rebellion.
 
What are then the impeding factors that have so far made the post “liberation” type regimes, and specifically the Isaias clique in Eritrea, impervious to a massive public protest? They have remained immune to such phenomenon in the twentieth century, but will the internet age, the crisis in the region and other factors lead to their denouement. Or to use the words of our avowed optimists, is the “spark” anywhere close?
 
Nothing is certain, but there is a dim hope that the rapid fall of the “Jurassic-Park-type” dinosaur governments in North Africa may augur well for the tired and muzzled people of Eritrea. The scenario of a titan-like people openly protesting at godena harnet, a version of the Tahrir Square in Egypt, or twittering a revolution is on the other hand very unrealistic. It is more likely a figment of the imagination of our people in the Diaspora bombarded with the dramatic images from the ongoing rebellion in the Arab states.  Like the coachman Zakhar in Tolstoy‘s War and Peace, who briefly lost himself in the immense snowy-plains of Russia, we have also lost our compass and particularly those that glamorize the Eritrean masses.
 
Generations of war
 
“Our struggle is long, but our victory is certain” or its version was the famous slogan adopted by many third world rebel movements of the last century. The rural masses for which this phrase was intended for neither deliberated in its formulation nor did they say amen to this popular phrase, which entailed a lot of hardship and suffering on them. It was the elite’s idea. Involuntarily harnessed or coerced to the political projects of an amalgam type of nationalists and revolutionaries, the peasants of Euro-Asia and rural Africans carried the disproportionate burden of the protracted wars.
 
In Russia, a small group of revolutionaries took power after a few weeks of insurrection, but the toll of the famine and the brutal war exacted the life and property of millions of them resulting in a regime that lasted almost seventy years. In China, after decades of war that involved the lives of two generations, the communists took power and have not released their grip until the present time.
 
The calamity did not spare Africa, for the armed groups in the former Portuguese colonies of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau launched a long and low intensity war resulting in victory. The burden from that era, and the subsequent civil wars, has left its terrible imprint on the masses of those countries. Likewise, the people of Zimbabwe unshackled themselves from the white settler colony of the former Rhodesia, yet were broken in by the “liberator” Mugabe.  Without exception, the political actors of the liberation era in Africa are still the hegemonic powers denying the rest of the society little public space for other political alternatives.
 
What is obtained so far from the histories of the nations above is that what took a generation or two for the “liberation” wars to succeed has left well entrenched regimes that may equally require the challenge and resources of many generations. As much as a shattering experience modifies the behavior of animal to change and adapt, people often also do the same. The much touted word “martyrs” conveniently used both by the regime and the opposition as a form of mass therapy will simply seep away. The masses will instead explore other coping mechanisms such as passivism, simulacra and exile, to the chagrin and perplexity of those who once again call for yet another sacrifice and steadfastness.
 
An eviscerated civil society
 
In the cyber debate recently, Yosief Ghebrehiwet unabashedly proposed the intervention of Ethiopia. His “Ethiopian card” raised the ire of all people, be it the government supporters or the “self-reliance” proponents, who subscribe to either non-violence or armed struggle or both. Had the criticism thrown at him included any relevant plan of action, the debate would have remained potent and vibrant. Had there been any simmering protest in Eritrea hidden or otherwise, their caution against the any type of interference from Ethiopia would have been acceptable.
 
Sadly, even nationalist intellectuals such as Petros Tesfagiorgis who like many of his sort adored the might of the proletariat forgot to mention about its current whereabouts in Eritrea. They fail to remember about it because the working class in our land is dead. The war years and the command economy of the Derg had gradually weakened it until the arrival of ghedli, which delivered it the coup de grace. To be frank, it is beyond resuscitation. In contrast, in both Tunisia and Egypt thousands of workers and civil servants have been still striking and demonstrating for their own benefit. They did not even show any solidarity with the rest desperately fighting for a drastic change. Eritrea still keenly celebrates International Women’s Day or March 8 at least in the Diaspora but nobody hears about May Day. Is that a clue to the reigning atmosphere in the country?
 
Hostile to any autonomous civil institutions, the new regime showed its true face towards the remaining working class by intimating their “association” with the Derg and dismissing any of their grievances. Their sole “guilt” was none other than their decision to wait-out the war. Their situation deteriorated when some of their leaders were made to disappear not long after the forced abduction of the G-15. Their counterparts, the civil servants, who are a mix of mostly former fighters and indentured Sawa youth, are demoralized or corrupt, at most, with little productive activities.
 
An asphyxiating realm
 
High-altitude dwellers in Eritrea suffer from inadequate oxygen and causes hot-temper in them, believe some observers.  It is a puzzle why they did not adapt and develop a broad chest like the Bolivian Indians. Compared to the inclement, the political environment is, however, more lethal. It has retarded the political, spiritual and even literal the physical growth of its inhabitants, not unlike the North Korean subjects. The inhospitable aspect of the country under the current rulers is closely related to the phenomenon of mass migration. Its myth of nationalist utopia can not hide it.
 
The military presence of the regime in rural Eritrea, in comparison to its municipal prevalence, is so immense that any notion of unrest in the cities in the form of urban guerrilla warfare or insurrection is not contemptible. Unlike the student elite of the Horn of Africa in the 70s, who used to quarrel about the proper tactics of war, the masses of “liberated” Eritrea have nowhere to maneuver. All they have is a cage for a nation.  The ghebar had gossiped about the “liberation elite”, who ignored them once they took the towns with barely any services such as health facilities. As if mocking them, the regime has since many years quartered tens of thousands of its soldiers in their villages. It is the rare instance, one might say, where a “failed” state had a strong presence outside the few towns. What policy enabled to do it?  
 
The regime has for the short time solved the phenomenon of what has been called “youth bulge” in the less developed countries by exiling it en mass to the countryside, and avoided the problem of unemployment. This measure has also helped the authorities not only exploit its labor at minimal cost, but bully the already tired rural folks into complete submission. We have, therefore, a political landscape that is strongly convenient for neither civil disobedience nor urban warfare, nor the customary guerrilla warfare, with which ghedli itself came to power.
 
If there is a total asymmetry in power relation anywhere, it is located in Eritrea. If there is anywhere naked power in its totality, it is also found in Eritrea. Unique, is what it is. It may be the envy of the huge army of Egypt with its corporate economy and yet does not monopolize all the capital, land and labor as the sole properties of the state. It may be the envy of the mountain kingdom of Yemen, where many tribes are armed, and curtailing the reach of the regime. The completely unarmed citizenry and tribes of Eritrea are no mekete (challenge) to the regime’s 300,000 or more numbered army. Unless some confuse this same army for an armed citizenry.
 
A state of ghedli
 
One of the important demands of the Arab protesters in North Africa is the lifting of the state of emergency that was enforced particularly in both Egypt and Algeria for many decades. Algeria has lately and reluctantly promised to withdraw it; its other sister state, Egypt, however, has so far resisted the persistent call of its subjects. Eritrea, however, has not even bothered to state an emergency decree during the entire post-independence period, not even during the second war with Ethiopia.
 
Its absence did not hinder the regime from emptying the majority of the able bodied people in the country. Consequently, Asmara and other towns were quiet and ghost like ever since. There was “order” in the rear of the battle line. This “fact” fooled some naive foreign journalists about a “bizarre” situation of witnessing a war in full progress in a front line located sixty to seventy kilometers in the front lines.
 
We have been feted with the talk about the neatness of Asmara for quiet some time, but extending the term to the horrible war was being totally mendacious. We Eritreans have the “can do” attitude, say many of our nationalists undeservedly. If we, instead, apply the alleged attitude to the regime, it would not be a cliche. Thanks to the seamless transformation of tsegatat mieda with the State of Eritrea, nothing was forbidden or untouchable.
 
Thus, its mode of governance was not different from the mieda years, and was even worse in many aspects. The arrest of citizens without due process of law and the confiscation of village lands without consulting the stakeholders and without compensation was a rampant practice. When, occasionally, people politely resist, the old and the weak were summarily forced into trucks destined for inhospitable barren islands around Massawa. The case of the villagers of Emba Derho is a good example. The urbanites, and in particular people living on the periphery of Asmara and Massawa, were also not spared.
 
In an age where slum dwellings are accepted as part of the Urban Environment by the United Nations, the authorities in Asmara had time and again demolished slums and squatter settlements in Asmera without impunity. In Zimbabwe, however, such draconian measure caused big protests in Harare, and also outside of the country. The status quo, therefore, has totally been immune to any type of civil disobedience.
 
Though authoritarian regimes are abhorrent, they at least hide behind the facade of laws that is not hidden from the public. The public has a tangible issue to struggle for, and would in many instances struggle patiently to have it dismantled. In the land of “democracy and justice”, Eritrea, however, such legal issues were considered as simply a nuisance. In other words, state of emergency though not openly stated was the matrix of daily life.
 
The reaction of the country’s elite both inside and outside the country was, with a few exceptions, pathetic and downright opportunistic. If asked about the last time of State of Emergency, they won’t hesitate to point the one under the Emperor that was in force in the late 60s. Blinkered with the love for the new nation, as they religiously put it, they have miserably failed to recognize it.
 
An occupation army
 
Familiar with the military coup plotters of the last century, observers were stupefied by the “trust” or “respect” of the Tunisian and Egyptian protesters in their standing armies. The harsh or hostile words were mostly thrown at the police and security services, which showed their vicious nature on the peacefully protesting people and the press confirming their dark history. The passive or lukewarm support of the standing armies in the revolt appears to have influenced the debate in the cyber world among Eritreans. A few have openly pushed or entertained the possibility of the Eritrean army allying with the suffering citizens. It is disingenuous, however.
 
In Eritrea, although there are the Eritrean Defense Force, and the nominal police, they never had a defined task. In the post independence period, the Eritrean police and the attorneys were often disparaged by Isaias but not without a reason. His contempt on these professions strongly indicates his equal disdain for the rule of law. Throughout the period, what he depended on was the infamous Commando.
 
This army unit, which butchered the peacefully disabled veterans in 1994, is also often seen deployed bullying peaceful crowds watching the familiar cycle races in Asmera. Yet, singling out the Commando for the repressive actions in the nation may lead one to a wrong conclusion. Its terror practices, though familiar to the urbanites, cannot be separated from the mundane violence perpetrated by the EDF in the rest of the country. The repressive history of this army largely led by high ranking officers of the ghedli during of the post-liberation period are closely linked with the past.
 
The other war
 
In the long war against two Ethiopian successive regimes, the tegadelti were operating in a landscape that was close to a civil war. There are different theories of civil war, but “armed conflict not of an international character” may adequately explain the one experienced in Eritrea. [Civil war - Wikipedia] A history on the intermittent wars between the EPLF and the ELF was to a certain extent covered simply because it was impossible to hide. On the other hand, the theme on the mini-wars of the fronts with various communities in Eritrea was either buried under or glossed over.
 
The culprit is without exception the narrative that dealt only with the conflict between the fronts and the Ethiopian authorities. Subsumed under it, however, the nationalist cause was contested by some ethnic groups throughout the duration of the independence war forcing the two fronts to interminably wage battles with the Kunama, the Afar, and later with different weredas of the Tigrigna highlanders. The conflict was, therefore, ugly and messy. When suppressed, a sizable number of the ethnic communities fled as refugees with their families to Ethiopia, but they were not accorded recognition as such.
 
Under such scenario the notion of strictly an Eritrean defense army is insincere, and at most a fabrication. The reluctance to put them in the category is not because they were a rag-tag army, without proper uniforms, shoes and logistics. It is rather because the civil war in its nature did not provide a clear cut boundary or enemy. Subsequently, the fronts were not governed by the niceties of rules made mainly for inter-state wars. They had also another disadvantage.
 
The legal and moral sphere that the non-state actors hailed from was to begin with was rudimentary and weak. It died out rapidly when it got corrupted completely with the hegemony of “revolutionary justice“. A direct consequence of this practice has been the murder and disappearance of thousands of not only fighters, as some would like it, but also countless ghebars. While the long war years are celebrated by some fellow nationalists, the fate of the untold numbers of people at the hands of the ghedli has yet to be recognized.
 
During the scourge of the AIDS epidemic in the 80s that took the lives of many thousands, communities all over America made quilts in memory of the victims by draping the Mall grounds in Washington D.C. If a propitious moment such as the Arab Spring was to arrive in our land and quilts were to be made with the names of every single individual on it, the area would possibly cover the size of the stadium in Asmera. Hence, the idea of EDF with its hidden skeletons as a savior of the people is simply reprehensible.
 
Conclusion
 
With the odds stacked against it, the sooner likelihood of the emancipation of the hapless subjects of Hadas Eritrea seems to be very bleak. Even the option of the Biblical exodus under Moses, a classic civil disobedience, has been denied to the people of Eritrea. When the opportunity arises, almost every individual is jumping the borders alone or with a few people, risking his precious life. This is none other than a typical behavior of an atomized citizen of a totalitarian state. In a circumstance where the average subject has no “card” to speak of, the clamor about the “Ethiopian card” is down right thoughtless.