Catholic Bishops Sounding the “Extinction” Alarm in Eritrea

Catholic Bishops Sounding the “Extinction” Alarm in Eritrea

By Yosief Ghebrehiwet

06/25/2014

There is not the slightest bit of doubt that the four Eritrean Catholic Bishops (Bishop Mengesteab Tesfamariam of Asmara, Bishop Kidane Yebio of Keren, Bishop Tomas Osman of Barentu and Bishop Feqremariam Hagos of Segeneiti), have made the existential crisis that the nation faces, best exemplified in the ongoing mass exodus, central to the message of their Pastoral Letter titled, Where Is Your Brother? [1] Almost every point that they lament about should be seen from its importance in negatively contributing to the making of that existential calamity. The environmental, economic, judicial, political, social, familial and spiritual degradations they mention are to be mainly seen as primary causes for this existential crisis, biblical as it happens to be in its scope and intractability.

In one of its most poignant moments, the Pastoral Letter says, “We are vividly witnessing as the nation gets denuded of its people in all social aspects, as the presence of not only the youth generation but also of the middle-aged generation in the land reaches a disappearing point (darga yelon). What are the chances of a nation without the youth generation and its vitality making it as a nation? …” Then, in the next paragraph, they go directly to the crux of the matter, “We are forced to say this because it is taking place right in front of our eyes; for it is not just the continuous outflow, and hence the depletion, of the people on its own that is worrying us, but the fact that we are heading towards extinction (tsanta) as a result …” [2] (emphasis mine)

It probably says it all that in the two excellent translations of the Pastoral Letter that have surfaced so far [3], the word “extinction” inexplicably disappears, even though there is no other word in English that would accurately describe the Tigrigna word “tsanta” than “extinction”; in fact, there is an exact correlation between the two. Here is how Semere Habtemariam, who claims that his is a better literal translation, translates that important statement in section 18 quoted above, “We are obliged to say this because it is happening right in front of our eyes; and we are duly concerned by the far-reaching ramifications of the continual exodus of refugees and the depletion of human capital will incur on the future of the country,” even though the Bishops make it crystal clear what that “far-reaching ramification” is: extinction as a people. Put conditionally, if there is a way of sustaining that mass exodus without the threat of extinction, their existential worry would have been curbed. In fact, they do provide us with such a hypothetical corrective mechanism in that same paragraph: the hope that those leaving the country would return in the future. But they are pessimistic on this ever happening, and hence their existential anxiety. Even though the sense of urgency in the letter is better captured by the AMECEA’s (Association of Member Episcopal Conference of East Africa) cryptic translation, “We are terrorized by the prospect of a drastic depopulation of the country”, it still remains critically wanting without that potent term “extinction”.

What makes the deletion of the term “extinction” in both translations puzzling is that the whole message of the Pastoral Letter gravitates around that particular state of the nation, as the Bishops foresee it: a people heading towards extinction. Their “awyat” (as Abba Mekonnen Amanuel puts it [4]) is meant to prevent that disaster from ever happening; the rest happen to be details of that biblical lamentation meant to wake us up from our slumber. So why this omission of the translators when it comes to the most potent conceptual term of the entire letter, and hence the dilution of the message? It is as if the translators, consciously or not, have found it hard to break away from the Eritrean elite’s state of mind in its denial that such existential threat does exist. The worry is that if the Eritrean elite admit that such a threat does exist, it would derail all the epiphenomenal projects that have preoccupied them for years, projects that have to do either with the legacy of the past (the struggle) or with the “Eritrea” of the future, always bypassing the existential threat of the present.

This article will focus on these questions: How come it is the Catholic Church only that is warning us of the existential disaster in the making?  Why not the Tewahdo Church, given that the Tewahdo population is equally facing the existential predicament that the Catholic population is facing? What makes the latter question important in the dynamics of change is that, given their large number, it is the participation of the Tewahdo that would make the critical difference inside Eritrea. And then there is the more puzzling question, even if though of less importance, regarding those outside Eritrea:  How come the diaspora elite have failed to see this existential disaster in the making?

There are a number of reasons as to why it is the Catholic Church that is sounding the existential alarm, no one reason of which is sufficient on its own but added up would make a potent argument. Below are some of these reasons: the first three factors have made it possible for the Catholic Bishops to speak out from a point of strength, the fourth contextualizes to a tradition of social activism within the Church; the fifth tells us where the source of their inspiration comes from, and the sixth provides the most important rationale as to why they are acting now:

(a)    The intimate relation that the Catholic Church has with its followers makes it difficult for Shaebia to take action against the Church without aggravating a sizable section of the population.

(b)   The strong institutional structure within the Catholic Church, with its command chain going all the way to Rome, makes it impossible for Shaebia to infiltrate or restructure it, as it had successfully done with the Tewahdo Church.

(c)    The Vatican happens to be, with all its national, continental and international influences, fully behind the Church; another hurdle that Shaebia has to factor in before it entertains any action against the Bishops.

(d)   There is a long tradition among Catholic priests of speaking out against injustices committed against the people, as exemplified in Eritrea a number of times – in 1991, 2001 and now in 2014.

(e)    The Pope as a source of inspiration cannot be discounted, especially since in this case he has given an impassioned speech in Lampedusa with the same Biblical theme “Where is your brother?” in a Mass commemorating the dead.

(f)    The crisis of its dwindling parishioners, and the efficiency of its bureaucracy in documenting it, has uniquely positioned the Catholic Church to see the extent of the existential predicament, as the Tewahdo authorities couldn’t.

But before getting into the comparative analysis between the two Churches and going over the details of the above mentioned six factors, I need to say a few words in regard to the sad state of mind of the Eritrean elite, with its misconstrued priorities; for it is only when contrasted with that confused state of mind that we appreciate the sense of urgency befitting to the existential crisis the nation is facing made central to the message of the Pastoral Letter.

Geza Mehanzel

Here is a parable that aptly describes the misconstrued priorities of the Eritrean elite’s state of mind:

In one highland village, there is this clan known as Geza Mehanzel (House of Mehanzel) that claims a long line of descendants, complete with a fabulous legend and many other venerable and heroic stories of its sons and daughters. The village being near a city, and one of the earliest to have a missionary school, Geza Mehanzel is proud for having produced a number of educated people, among them many scholars, disproportionate to its size. One of those scholars, who now teaches at a foreign university, has been active for yeas collecting everything that has to do with the clan: its long genealogy, its venerable traditions, its fantastic legend, the saga of its heroes, the piety of its monks and nuns, the story of the church and its priests, the history of the missionary school, the achievements of its modern scholars, the heroic participation of its sons and daughters in the revolution, a long list of its venerated martyrs, detailed maps of its location in the village and its farmlands, photographs collected through the years, any written material that has to do with it, etc. In addition, together with other scholars that hail from the same House in diaspora, the scholar has prepared some vital documents that would help Geza Mehanzel in running its daily affairs in the village life: in church, school, clinic, farms, meadow, etc. The developmental projects they have in mind include building a micro-dam and clinic, introducing tap water and electricity and renovating the old school. The professor hasn’t forgotten the cultural aspect of his mission either, for he has all the modern equipment ready to document it as it takes place in the village: baptisms, marriages, funerals, festivals, church services, harvests, etc. He believes only if these societal riches are collected into a village archive would the next generation of Geza Mehanzel that inherits it keep excelling the way its predecessors have done. And to this effect, he gathers all the work that he has done; arms himself with all kinds of modern equipments; collects enough money from descendants in diaspora; and flies to Eritrea with all the determination, steadfastness and perseverance that the clan is known for.

There was though one problem that the good professor has entirely overlooked in his zeal to do good as he sees it, one that he comes to realize only when he arrives at the village he has left decades ago: to his utter shock he finds out that, except for some few old folks in dilapidated hudmos, the entire Geza Mehanzel happens to have emigrated. Most of the houses, clearly falling apart out of neglect even as the doors and windows remain securely shut, have been abandoned. He couldn’t find even a single kid from the House in the missionary school he used to attend as a child. It seems that in all his zeal for documenting anything and everything that has to do with Geza Mehanzel in terms of “pride and dignity”, the professor has forgotten the most important of all that has been crying out loud for documentation: the exodus of all those who have been leaving the village to foreign lands. It is only then that he grasps that the legend, genealogy, history, heroism, scholarship, piety, tradition, etc of the House has to emigrate too, for all the descendants who could be made to listen to that rich legacy are to be found scattered all over in foreign lands. None of the other clans in the village has shown any interest to hear about the accomplishments of Geza Mehanzel; to them, when that clan has been rendered extinct, so has anything associated with it. Totally dejected, the professor gathers all his work and equipment resignedly and flies back to his adopted country, vowing never to set foot again on that “desolate” land.

The morale of the story is that the Eritrean elite, especially of the Kebessa type, are so preoccupied with the legacy of the struggle, including the very idea of a “nation” that exists detachedly above and over the masses on the ground, that they never ask as to who is meant to inherit that “legacy”. It wouldn’t be surprising if that intangible legacy has already started emigrating, surreally following them wherever they have built their new habitat. Like the case of the scholar above, who was so enamored with the achievements of Geza Mehanzel (his point of pride) that he failed to see its extinction in its ancestral land before it is too late, the Eritrean elite are also so obsessed with the legacy of the revolution (their point of pride) that they are unable to see the existential predicament of their people on timely basis. Like an old maid who finds solace from the fact that once “nibur fetina”, even as that short-lived marriage brought her nothing but mental and physical abuse, the Eritrean elite are so elated that their Eritrea “nibur fetina” as a nation, that they refuse to notice the existential calamity. On the other hand, in one of the most refreshing documents ever to surface from Eritrea, the Catholic Bishops are telling all of us that we cannot own any legacy, let alone a nation, without our people squarely making their home on the land of their forefathers: once the people go extinct, so does anything that is associated with them in the land.

Why do the elite (the Mehanzel generation) refuse to see the writing on the wall? After all, it is writ in bold figures for everyone who knows his addition to see. Let me repeat what I have said before regarding this looming extinction in numbers in Kebessa Eritrea’s Suicide Mission I & II [5]:

This year refugee arrivals in Ethiopia increased so rapidly that up to 1,000 people a week came during February. [6] Provided this trend has been continuing, we are looking at a 50,000 a year figure for refugees that cross to Ethiopia only. If we add a similar flow of refugees to Sudan, we have roughly a 100,000 refugees flow within the span of just one year. And this number takes account of only those who register with the UNHCR. Dan Connell comes up with more alarming numbers that takes account of the unregistered refugees too: given that the 300,000 refugees registered by the UNHCR make up only a portion of all that have left the country, he puts the figure around one million. [7] But even if we take the most conservative estimate and cut the number of the unregistered into half of that, the total would be about 650,000. For a tiny nation like Eritrea, with a population of less than 4 million, this amounts to a demographic collapse in the making. And for Kebessa Eritrea, whose entire youth population is on the move, it is nothing short of a holocaust.

But the numbers only do not tell the whole story. One ha to take to take into account  the skewed demographics of those leaving (mostly young men) and the impact that this is having on the plummeting birth rate inside the country to get the full picture. Given that an entire generation of men who would have been fathers by now has left the nation for good, a demographic collapse at the center is already in the making. To provide a rough estimate, if the hundreds of thousands of adult men that have left the land for good were left alone in peace to raise their families in Eritrea (with the hundreds of thousands of women trapped inside the country), by now there would have been hundreds of thousands of children born to them. To take a most conservative estimate, if we take the Kebessa adult men that left the land to be around 200,000, then we have at minimum roughly 600,000 unborn children to take into account. If the women, the overage and underage refugees are included, we could say Kebessa Eritrea has lost almost a million within a span of time of just a decade. And this estimate is reached only if we go by the conservative numbers that the UN has provided.

Thus, this demographic collapse at the center is of the most serious type. When all those who are done with raising children (in their 50s and above) and all the unmarried women in Eritrea most of whom will end up being spinsters are out of the picture, what we get is a society getting slimmer and slimmer demographically as every male that reaches the eligible age for national service leaves the nation. The children born to this society get fewer and fewer as this scenario gets momentum, as it is happening right now, with the floodgates opened wide for anyone to flee the nation. With the hollowing out of the center, few newborns arrive to replenish the society. This is how Kebessa is coming closer and closer towards to the edge of extinction.

It seems to me that the problem of Eritrea has long ago stopped being political or even humanitarian; it has become a subject matter for “pure mathematics” to handle. Provide any fourth-grader who knows his addition with the figures of all those who are fleeing the nation in mass exodus per month/year and the years it takes in Eritrean minds to realize they are heading towards extinction, he would figure it out in few minutes when the cataclysmic end would be arriving. For lack of a fourth-grader head, uncluttered with revolutionary and nationalistic rhetoric, a nation is being lost.

The Mehanzel generation, on the other hand, with its mind cluttered with all kinds of ghedli paraphernalia – netsanet, harnet, meswaitenet, tewefayinet, jegninet, ghedlina, ereye-erena, etc – has been unable to see this apocalyptic end of the ghedli project coming. We can see this love for the ghedli-concocted “Eritrea” displayed in all kinds of epiphenomenal projects that the diaspora elite have been preoccupied with. It requires a runaway imagination with all kinds of imagined things to sustain their imagined “Eritrea”: an imagined enemy from outside that never leaves the scene, Ethiopia; an imagined threat of the same enemy from inside, a Demhit army of 50,000 [8] (they had to multiply it by 100 to render it a threat); an imagined constitution, one that from the outset was never meant to be implemented; an imagined colonial oppression to justify their revolution, an imagined dichotomy between netsanet and harnet to provide rationale to ghedli in retrospect, an imagined “unity” (hadinetna), one that has existed only in map, always maintained under supervision of powerful forces; an imagined hidri suwuatna, without having any clue what that “dream’ was all about; an imagined uprising (forto), whose rebels were talked out of their rebellion in few hours in a ghedli-talk comprehensible to both the rebel and the pacifier; imagined heroes, almost all of them with dubious records; etc. It is no surprise that constructing an imagined “Eritrea” that finds no correspondence with the real Eritrea on the ground requires so many self-delusional lies to sustain it. In all of their preoccupations, the elite don’t realize that it is the imagined “Eritrea” that is killing the real Eritrea on the ground. And true to the Geza Mehanzel tradition, these diaspora elite will be telling these revolutionary and patriotic stories that have to do with their imagined country to their children, long after the real country has been made “desolate” and off limits to all their descendants.

With no such revolutionary or nationalistic malaise clouding their eyes, the Bishops are telling us in no unclear terms that such extinction is in fact in the making. What makes the Pastoral Letter unique is that it is the first time any Eritrean organization, be it religious or secular, to have focused on the existential predicament of the nation with such intensity. But the questions still remain: Why the Catholic Church only? Why not the Twahdo Church? Below, I will first repost an abridged version of my article Tewahdos’ Complicity in the Demise of their Church, written in May 2008, to provide us a point of contrast, before I come back to the six points mentioned above.

Begin quote:

Tewahdos’ Complicity in the Demise of their Church [9]

An all out assault against the Tewahdo Church has now been going on for years: its reform-minded pastors thrown behind bars; thousands of its youth prohibited from attending Sunday School; its Patriarch vilified, demoted and house-arrested; its monasteries raided (giffa) in utter contempt to tradition and religion; its priests and monks forcefully conscripted into the army; its administrative body overtaken by a layman; its leaders hand-picked by the Isaias regime; its progress in reform totally reversed by regressive forces; its very structure drastically altered from top to bottom to fit Shaebia’s evil designs; its body isolated from its parental Coptic Church in Alexandria; etc. Yet, among the Tewahdos, no sense of outrage can be detected; none at all. It is as if all this is happening to an entity totally alien to themselves …

Almost all the ills that have been stoking the Eritrean masses can be traced to one tragic confluence: that of the culture of abuse of ghedli with that of the culture of conformity of the masses. To each of these cultures, many contributing strands can be mentioned. But in this article, I will confine myself to looking at the meeting of two strands only, one from each, in the all-out assault against the Tewahdo Church that Shaebia has successfully unleashed: (a) Shaebia’s vulgar pragmatism, one of its most potent weapons in its arsenal of abuse; (b) and the Tigrignas’ weak and confused sense of identity that is to account for their tendency to romanticize and embrace the ghedli-concocted identity, one that often gives in to the slightest bit of coercion and manipulation.

Shaebia’s vulgar pragmatism

Shaebia is very much known for its vulgar pragmatism, but pragmatism nevertheless. It is vulgar because whatever it does is guided by no higher economic, social, cultural, ethical, political or ideological principle; this “pragmatism” is nihilistic to the core. The single objective of this pragmatism always remains the same: self-preservation above anything else. The means of achieving this objective is: whatever it takes or anything that works. The only inhibiting question that it asks in pursuing this objective is: can I get away with it? In the process of doing so, nothing else matters; even the nation’s very existence is fair game.

The despot of Asmara is not as irrational as we make him to be. Even the most outrageous steps he takes are done only after carefully testing the waters. This is especially so when the step entertained is thought to be very sensitive. True to his vulgar pragmatism, the only question that he asks as he ventures into one social experimentation after another is: would they let me do it? And to find out, like a meticulous scientist, he carefully conducts his social experimentation starting from a relaxed one, working his way up to the stringiest one; always sizing up the situation as he increases the pressure incrementally. At every incremental level, he keeps testing the waters by carefully assessing the reaction of the masses. If we look at how he handled two very sensitive cases – that of G-15 and that of Patriarch Antonios – we will notice that it took him a long stretch of time in each case to accomplish his mission, a step by step approach that kept constantly testing the people’s level of tolerance.

Given the above, it is no wonder that Shaebia prefers to conduct its social experimentations first and foremost on one ethnic group – the Tigrigna – that has so far shown no sense of outrage when it comes to the brutalization of its various population groups: its womenfolk, its peasants, its heads of families, its exiled youth, its minority churches, its main religious denomination, its Patriarch, etc. No wonder that the more this population lets him do whatever he wants, the more the despot demands of it. And the more the Tigrignas let themselves be Shaebia’s guinea pigs, the more contempt the tyrant has for that population and the more brutal get his experimentations.

Testing waters

If we look at how the tyrant worked his way up in the scale of abuse – from defamation to outright arrest – in the cases of G-15 and Patriarch Antonios, we notice striking similarities. Both required a careful step by step approach that took a substantial amount of time to accomplish what he set out to do. In the case of Patriarch Antonios, it took him more than two years to go through carefully orchestrated steps to finish his demonic job. These incremental steps were structured with the public’s reaction in mind; he never took any step without testing the waters first. Here are the four steps that he took in the cases of G-15 and the Patriarch:

First, aspersions are cast, with no official statements to back them up. The Shaebia mill of rumors is set in full motion, with the targeted individuals as having fallen out of favor of Isaias for doing this or that. This is done with the aim of gauging the opinion of the man on the street. In the case of Patriarch Antonios, this initial stage started with the Patriarch’s courageous stand against the unsolicited incursions into the Church’s domain by the tyrant. The Patriarch refused to close down the Sunday School of the Medhanie Alem Church (a magnet to thousands of youth), confronted the tyrant and demanded that the detained pastors be released and strongly objected to the fact that a layman (Yoftahe Dimetros) was assigned by the regime to administer the Church. It is these three events that triggered the incremental assault on the Tewahdo Church. Of course, Shaebia’s defamation process started where it matters most – among the clergy – before it ventured out among the public.

Second, the targeted individuals are demoted, “frozen” or relegated to positions where they are rendered impotent. Then the tyrant lets a significant amount of time to pass without taking a major step to see how the public would react. If the public doesn’t seem to care either way, it is time for him to go one step further. And this is exactly what the despot did with Patriarch Antonios. He sent his hit man Yoftahe Dimetros to set this process in motion. The first thing the errand boy did was to take away all the administrative power from the Patriarch, rendering the position of the Patriarch impotent. This was a necessary move in laying the ground for the “divide and conquer” strategy that was soon to cause havoc in the Church. This waiting game was made not only with the Tewahdo public’s reaction, but also with the clergy’s, in mind. When the tyrant sent Yoftahe to Alexandria with a hand-picked “Patriarch,” it was primarily meant to gain legitimacy in silencing the public and the clergy. When that move turned out to be a farce, he had no choice left but to do the more unconventional demoting process of the Patriarch all on his own.

Third, a “divide and conquer” policy is fully implemented, followed by an active demonization process targeting both the “accused” entity and its supporters (now with official backing), where the foot soldiers pan out among the population to lay the groundwork for the final assault to be taken. Again, all this is done with an eye to the public reaction. If they sense little resistance and much cheerleading, then it is time again to ratchet up the persecution process. This was also a critical step in the case of the Patriarch, because initially the overwhelming majority of the population and clergy were on his side. It was then essential for the GoE to exploit an existing fault line to widen a rift between the conservative and liberal wings of the Church. ... After correctly sizing up the muted reaction of the clergy and the public, Shaebia put the Patriarch under house arrest, though left at his house and still accessible to few.

And fourth, the despot makes his last move: he goes for the kill and puts those targeted individuals behind bars. Then a public indictment of the accused by Shaebia cadres, in absence of any judiciary process, is set in full motion, officially accusing the arrested with various crimes against the nation in retrospect and vigilantly hunting for anyone who shows the slightest bit of sympathy for the arrested. In the case of the Patriarch, this final process has been recently finalized by officially replacing the Patriarch with one hand-picked by the tyrant and then by forcing his eviction from the traditional home of Patriarchs. And now that they have secluded the Patriarch in a permanent house-arrest, the GoE apparatus has been fully unleashed to stamp out any remaining resistance. At this point in time, nobody knows where the Patriarch is; his seclusion and inaccessibility has become total.

We can clearly see that all along, at every incremental level, the despot has been warily looking at the reaction of the Tewahdo population. A clear indication that the despot does not take major steps without testing the waters is that, in some instances, he has (outrageous as this claim may seem) actually backed away from taking some seriously entertained steps; in some other cases he has reversed himself in implementing a certain policy; and in many instances he has applied his experimentations selectively on population groups that he believed he could easily get away with. An example of the first kind is when he backed away from imposing army conscription on Muslim women. An example of the second kind is when he quietly withdrew most women from the trenches. And an example of the third kind is the case of clergy conscription in the army, where it is selectively applied on the Tewahdo Church [that is, as opposed to the Catholic Church]. Let’s now look at the cases of conscription of women and clergy in the army to understand how Shaebia takes the path of least resistance in all its efforts to subjugate the masses.

(a) Women’s conscription into the army

When the Muslim population in Eritrea courageously stood up against the forced conscription of their women into the army, the tyrant backed down without admitting it officially. The Muslim resistance to such an incursion into their womenfolk was so determined that he quickly realized that he cannot easily get away with it. Except for some few token Muslim women from the urban area, the Muslim population group was exempted from this misguided policy and spared from all the horrendous consequences that such a policy brought about. But this same policy was ruthlessly and indiscriminately applied on the Christian population. Now, don’t get me wrong; this was not because the tyrant loved the Muslims more than the Christians. His reason was much more brutally pragmatic (true to Shaebia’s vulgar pragmatism): he thought if he could apply it selectively on the Christians, he could get away with it, with little protest from the population. We have to remember that Shaebia always takes the path of least resistance (remember the Tigrigna proverb, “hasecha dembe ab zlemlemelu”). And, time and again, it has been proven right.

A rare case where Shaebia reversed its policy is regarding women in the trenches. The Christian parents began to show their outrage to women conscription into the army only when they saw the extent of sexual abuse that their daughters had undergone under the hands of PFDJ army officials. Only when their daughters came back to the cities and towns deeply traumatized, with tales of horror to tell – sexual coercion, mass rape, unwanted pregnancies, life-threatening abortions, illegitimate children, HIV infection, etc. – did they began to have second thoughts. Many of them were to be stigmatized for the rest of their lives, with little prospect of marriage. Some returned with serious mental problems in a land where there are no viable mental institutions. As a result, outrage among the public was palpable, and the Monster of Asmara sensed it. He quietly withdrew most of the women from the trenches, without ever publicly admitting that the policy has been a total disaster …

(b) Clergy conscription into the army

That Shaebia doesn’t have the slightest bit of respect for the age-old tradition of the people is not only displayed in its forced conscription of women into the army, but also of the clergy. As pointed out above, it would be worthwhile to note that in the 17 centuries of Christianity in the region, not a single ruler has ever attempted to undertake such a sacrilegious act. So Shaebia’s contempt for tradition and religion is, in this case, as clear and as tangible as could be. Yet, the tyrant again shows his pragmatism when applying this demonic policy on the ground. He selectively raids Coptic churches and monasteries to round up the clergy to be sent to Sawa. The reason why Shaebia has so far refrained from doing the same thing to the Catholic Church is, again, simple: the Catholic Church has courageously, and with one voice, stood up against the incursion of the despot in its domain. They even responded to him with a strongly worded letter objecting to his efforts to recruit their clergy into the army. It also helps that the Church has the power, prestige and influence of the Vatican behind it.

In contrast, the Orthodox Church has neither a strong institution of international renown to back it up nor the cohesion among its clergy and its followers necessary in such confrontation. In fact, it was able to withstand the onslaught of the Isaias regime as long as it did through the sheer courage and integrity of one man: Patriarch Antonios. As soon as Shaebia got a foothold in the Church’s domain, it was not hard for this criminal organization to divide the Church and sow discord among its clergy and parishioners. Since the day of the plan’s inception, slowly but meticulously, the tyrant has been inching his way up to the total domination of the Coptic Church. And now, with the final arrest of the Patriarch, his nefarious mission is accomplished.

Now, what we have to ask is this: Why does Shaebia prey on the Tewahdos, among the major religions, disproportionately? What is it about the Tigrignas, in general, and the Tewahdos, in particular, that Shaebia finds it conducive for its social experimentation? There are two characteristics that we need to look at: the confused sense of identity of the Tigrignas and the vulnerability of Tewahdo in face of modernity.

Bypassing their identity

Among all the ethnic groups in Eritrea, the Tigrignas have the most confused sense of identity. They have never developed a sense of being one people. At most, they recognize themselves regionally as Seraye, Hamasien or Akeleguzay, but rarely as Tigrignas. In fact, they have always tried to bypass their Tigrigna identity so as to embrace their Eritrean identity. That means that whatever happens to them in virtue of being Tigrignas will never be admitted, if ever registered in the first place. This confused sense of identity has left them susceptible to the predatory habits of Shaebia; it has found it easy to sow discord among them through division and manipulation.

It is easy to divide the Tigrignas along religious, regional, generational and even gender lines. It is easy to convince them that what is actually their part as alien to themselves. As a result, they have developed this strange propensity to discover enemies within themselves under the slightest manipulation. It is easy to convince Christian Tigrignas that the Jebertis are alien to them. Conversely, it is easy to convince Jebertis that they have a distinct identity other than the Tigrigna ethnic group. No such division is seen among Bilen or Kunama. It has also been easy for Shaebia to persecute Jehovah Witnesses and Evangelical Christians with such brutality because the Tigrignas don’t see this as happening to parts of themselves, but to identities alien to themselves. Shaebia has also been using regionalism to plant discord among them. The Tigrignas of the three regions keep blaming one another, thus deflecting the blame from Shaebia, while they suffer equally under the brutality of Shaebia. The Warsai-Yikealo divide also has most resonance among this population group ... Even the brutality that has been happening to their women is hardly perceived as something that is happening to the Tigrigna women; and whenever admitted (which is rare), in their “equalizing” mood, it is seen either as individual instances or as something that is happening to the abstract “Eritrean woman” in general. And when it comes to seeking “purity,” … they are always in the process of purging the “undesirable” from within themselves …

The urban phenomenon

The Tigrignas’ confused sense of identity didn’t simply come out of nowhere. The fact that the other ethnic groups didn’t fall prey to the predatory culture of ghedli to the extent that the Tigrignas did calls for a different explanation than what all the ethnic groups have experienced under ghedli in common. Even though ghedli contributed a lot to the confused state of identity of the Tigrignas, it was able to do so to the extent it did only because there was already a frayed identity on which to prey upon. If so, what we have to do is to look at the root of this confused identity long before (or separate from) the ghedli phenomenon: the urban phenomenon.

Unlike the other religions in Eritrea, the Tewahdo Church has been having a huge crisis in facing modernity; a factor that has handicapped it in the face of a decades-old assault from ghedli. It is the least structured religion and, hence, the least equipped to face the challenges of modernity. Until recently, it has never been able to admit, let alone to come up with a coherent policy, on how to face this challenge. This makes it especially urgent in the case of Tewahdo because most of the urbanization (Asmara) took in its midst.

The Tewahdo Church still remains structured along the archaic feudal lines that can only be made to meet the spiritual needs of the rural area, if at all. The schooling system, all the way from deaqon to debtera, is still a throwback to the feudal times. The priests who have undergone such a traditional education can hardly meet the challenges they face from the urban generation that demands more than symbols in its quest for spirituality. The “rational” aspect of the spirituality that this generation has been seeking is impossible to be met under this archaic condition. That is why the defection rate to other religions is highest among the urban Tewahdos. And by the same token, so is this urban generation’s defection to the ghedli religion. Part of the tendency of this group to romanticize ghedli comes from the spiritual and cultural void created from the failure of the Tewahdo Church. During the pre-independence era, the certainty that this generation has been desperately looking for were to be met in the ghedli environment only. The fact that many true believers, even now, openly declare that “Shaebianism” or “Eritreanism” is their religion tells it all. It seems that, for long, the urban generation’s spiritual quest has been met by ghedli. But not anymore, hence Shaebia’s hostility towards all the “new” religions that are taking away its “parishioners.”

This is not to say that the followers of other religions, so far as they were urban dwellers, were immune to the appeal of ghedli; it is only that they came out from the ghedli era less affected “spiritually.” For instance, a Muslim who has gone through the acculturation process of ghedli is less likely to be negatively affected as a fellow Muslim. That is to say that, culturally and spiritually, he is better inoculated to resist the ghedli virus than a Christian. For instance, a Christian is more likely to embrace communism whole-heartedly; and worse, more likely to fully immerse himself into the nihilist culture of Shaebia. That is to say, he is more likely to swap his religion for ghedli ideology and his identity for ghedli-concocted identity. And in the case of urban Tewahdos, their “immune system” has been so weakened by a structure-less religion that an attack by a ghedli virus is more likely to be lethal, and its malignant effects to last long.

Conclusion

From the above, it is easy to see how Shaebia’s religious policy is guided by its most famous maxim of vulgar pragmatism: can I get away with it? When it comes to the minority religions, it set out to totally obliterate them because it believed it can get away with it without any threat whatsoever. First of all, their numbers were too small to be threat on their own. But central to this decision is also the knowledge that no other Tigrignas will ever stand up for these minority religions. So the realization that the Tigrignas consider these minority groups as alien to themselves (even though almost all of them belong to the Tigrigna ethnic group) was very essential to the regime’s calculation.

When it comes to the major religions, Shaebia’s approach was more cautious. In the Catholic case, it very much realizes that its chance of manipulating the structure of the Church is zero; it would be unthinkable for it to put its own choice of Bishop at the helm. It would also find it very hard, if not impossible, to recruit its clergy for its army. But outside that, the fate of its adherents remains the same as that of Tewahdo adherents – for instance, in the case of women’s conscription into the army. In the Muslim case, the GoE had a hand in picking the Mufti; and it had disappeared hundreds of Muslims under the guise of fighting fundamentalism. But when it comes to the kind of deep structural change that has been seen in the Tewahdo Church, Shaebia wouldn’t even dare think of it. And when it comes to its womenfolk, is a no-no. But when it comes to Tewahdo, there is no bottom line as to how far Shaebia will go in its abuse. And the reason is simple: the Tewahdos are allowing it.

End quote

Why the Catholic Church?

The abridged version of the 2008 article above partly responds to the “why not the Tewahdo Church” part of the question this article is grappling with, but I have yet to address the “why the Cathloic Church” part of that question. At the beginning of this article, I mentioned three factors that made it possible for the Catholic Church to speak out against the unsustainable prevailing conditions in the land from a point of strength: a very tight link with its followers, a modernized and strong institutional structure and the backing of the strong and influential Vatican; a fourth factor that puts it within a broader context: a tradition of social activism; a fifth factor that locates the main source of its inspiration: Pope Francis’ address at Lampedusa; and a sixth factor that has uniquely positioned it to see the existential predicament of the people ahead of others: its efficient documentation capability. Let me now go over these six factors:

Speaking out from a point of strength

The only reason why the Isaias regime has been reluctant to deal with the Catholic Church as it has done with the other denominations is because it has felt, true to its vulgar pragmatism, that it cannot easily get away with it; that is, it is afraid of the consequences that might follow its actions. All that we have to do then is try to figure out what those consequences that the regime is afraid of might be.

One of the main reasons that have made it possible for the Catholic Church to send its message from a point of strength is the intimate link it has with the Catholic community. Serray puts it this way in response to a fellow commentator who wants to attribute the entire agency behind the Pastoral Letter to the Vatican [9]:

“What your questions take away is the idea of organic and courageous resistance. I have no ready made answer why the leaders of the Eritrean Catholic Church are courageous when the leaders of the other religion are chickens. But if I were to guess, I would say it has to do with the response from Catholics if their church leaders were arrested or harassed. I would say the connection of the believers with their leaders is stronger for Catholics. When the church leaders are assigned by an atheist regime, the followers might not be as inspired as the followers of a church that keeps its way of doing things intact.”

Unlike the link between the Tewahdo Church and its adherents that has been frayed by many factors (some of which have been mentioned above in the old article), the link between the Catholic Church and its followers remains to be very strong. If we remember how Shaebia got away easily with the demotion and detention of Patriarch Antonios, we can see the difficulty that any Tewahdo authority who wants to speak out would be met with, given that he would have to do that from a weak position, with little backing, if any, from the Church hierarchy, the Tewahdo masses or any other potent organization from outside. That is why, even though I agree with Serray’s assessment above, I believe his last sentence in the paragraph has to be qualified first for it to make sense. Even though the regime’s handpicking of the Church’s leader further weakened the link between the Tewahdo Church and its followers, it is precisely because the link had already been rendered weak structurally that such an assignment was made possible in the first place. If we are to trace the problem to its roots, we have to look at the confluence of the two enduring factors mentioned above that have rendered the Church vulnerable to the regime’s unsolicited incursions: the archaic structure of the Church that is not amenable to modernity and the relentless assault on its culture from the nihilist culture of ghedli.

One need to look at the tag of war between the Isaias regime and the Catholic Church that has been going on for years to appreciate how the relation between the Church and its adherents works: not only top-down, but also bottom-up. Let me mention one case that highlights this phenomenon: the way the first Mediterranean tragedy that took place off the coast of Libya in 2011, where hundreds of Eritreans drowned, was handled. When the grieving parishioners pressured the priests, the latter formed a committee, with the intention of conducting Mass for the dead in all the Catholic parishes in Eritrea. This freaked out the government to such an extent that it sent a message of warning to the Bishop worded in strongest possible terms. It must have been couched as an “all out war” to follow if the Mass took place for the Bishop to back out at the last moment. The priests were not exactly happy about this decision even though they made it clear they were not going to disobey their Bishop. The point here is not whether the Bishop was right or wrong in his decision, but how the relation between the Church and its followers happens to be a two-way street, a fact that has made Shaebia so far wary when it treads into the Catholic territory.

The second source of strength of the Catholic Church comes from its institutional structure. Since the power structure starts from the Pope in the Vatican, passes through elaborate religious hierarchy of regional, national and zonal substructures that includes cardinals, archbishops, bishops, priests and deacons, all the way to the laity, it is virtually impossible for an outside body to interfere in this chain of hierarchy without declaring war on the Vatican. There is no weak spot in this chain of hierarchy for Shaebia’s predatory incursion to take place. In contrast, in addition to its already frayed internal structure, the Tewahdo Church was cut off first from the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and later from the Alexandria Church; all of which made it easy for Shaebia to work from inside to restructure it to its nefarious end.

A good example would be how easy it had been for Shaebia to pry the Tewahdo Church from the Ethiopian Church, while no such attempt was ever attempted in regard to the Catholic Church. Politics definitely got the upper hand when such decision was made, but the point is that only the Tewahdo Church was readily available for such restructuring with its outside link from the very start; since this took place just after independence, long before an all out assault against it was conducted a dozen or so years later. In contrast, the link between the Catholic Churches in Eritrea and Ethiopia remained relatively strong before the border war. But even in the trying times after the border war, though somewhat frayed, that link hasn’t been totally cut off. Recently, Pope Francis, in an address given to Bishops from Eritrea and Ethiopia at the Vatican, praised them as a model of unity, “The Church in Ethiopia and Eritrea is a unique example of ‘witness to the unity of the People of God’, which though from different countries and different rites, ‘each with its own particular richness’, share the same mission of service of Christ and his Church.” [10] That is to say, the ghedli virus found a receptive body in the already weakened Tewahdo Church, and easily caused its severance from its outside links.

The third source of strength is, of course, the Vatican. If Shaebia decides to fight the Eritrean Catholic Church the way it has done with the Tewahdo Church, or even worse, the way it has harshly dealt with the Evangelical Churches, it realizes that it would be fighting the Vatican itself. But it has to be remembered that although the Isaias regime is known for its quixotic posturing against the mighty and powerful – the US, UN, AU, IGAD, NGOs, Ethiopia, etc – so far it has refrained from doing so with the Vatican, for two reasons, one external and the other internal. First, the huge power and influence that the Vatican wields in Italy, Europe and its parishes throughout the world cannot be easily discounted, especially since any maneuvering room left for the regime in the West are to be located in Europe [for instance, the upcoming Bologna festival or the many YPFDJ gatherings]. But since the regime has been known to undertake more quixotic ventures when it comes to “foreign enemies”, again what must have tipped the balance in this case is when the Vatican’s power gets buttressed from an internal link.

I don’t think any particular population group in Eritrea would take offense, take it as directed against its body, when the regime keeps bombarding the airwaves with diatribes against the US, UN, AU, IGAD, NGOs or Ethiopia. But if that is going to be done against the Vatican, there is no doubt that the Catholic community in Eritrea would take it “personal”. We have to realize that the Catholic religion is unique among other faiths in the kind of relation its followers have with one single person: the Pope. On this earth, he is their most revered figure, and even taken to be infallible in his capacity as a Pope in his office. That is to say, anyone who slights the Vatican slights the Pope – a reason why the regime has so far refrained from an all out attack against the Vatican, as it has done with many other powerful entities.

In Shaebia’s vulgar pragmatism we have seen that, true to its predatory nature, it never goes for the kill without first isolating its prey. In the case of the Eritrean Catholic Church, it has so far failed to isolate it at its two vertical ends: from the Catholic community inside the country and from that larger chain of command that goes all the way to Rome. That is why Shaebia would be scared to death to see that point of strength further buttressed through a lateral link with the other major religions in the land – something that the Pastoral Letter tries to achieve by virtue of its message that appeals to all.

A tradition of social activism

There has been a long tradition of social activism in the Catholic Church. One that stands out in the history of Vatican’ is the Rerum Noverum (Revolutionary Change) of Pope Leo XIII written in 1891 when the adverse effects of industrialization was being felt among the working poor. For its time, this was a marvelous document with its overarching theme against the exploitation of the workers. Although in its stance it was clearly against socialism, the encyclical decried unbridled capitalism and promoted social justice. It prescribed the formation of unions; supported collective bargaining; condemned child labor; advocated for safe work environment, decent working hours and living wages; and came up with the important concept of “preferential option for the poor”. [11]

This tradition was to continue with similar but updated encyclicals of other Popes. All these encyclicals happened to influence the Catholic Churches in different countries. For instance, the tradition of social activism in the US is to bee seen in its role in shaping labor unions, in its opposition of capital punishment, in its participation in peace movements and in the activities of its various relief services.

That doesn’t mean that the Vatican was always on the side of the oppressed. For instance, when Liberation Theology swept Latin America, given its leftist overtones, it was mostly done against the wish of the Vatican. In fact, it is believed that it was under the two staunch anticommunist popes – Pope John Paul II and Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (who later became Pope Benedict XVI) – that the Liberation Theology came under a concerted attack by the Vatican. Now, when that leftist threat is over, we are seeing some overtures towards those protest priests by Pope Francis. [12] Yet, despite the negative role the Vatican played in those years in Latin America, many among the Catholic clergy, some of whom were bishops (who could possibly forget the brave Archbishop Oscar Romero), were at the forefront in the fight against military dictatorships that scarred Latin America for decades.

From the above, we can see that the Vatican’s role in social activism is of a mixed bag. But the point I want to make is this: there is no doubt that there is enough of that history of social activism both in the Vatican and among the clergy (be it supported by the Vatican or not) from which the Eritrean Catholic bishops and priests could draw their inspiration.

Another factor that has helped the Catholic Church to adopt a universal language when it deals with humanitarian abuses is the modernity factor. In fact, Rerum Noverum was written to meet the demands of a modern world that was getting increasingly industrialized. This has to be seen in contrast with other religions, especially of the fundamentalist types, that find adopting a universal tone when addressing their downtrodden virtually impossible. For instance, Islam in the Middle East, even as it overtly plays a political role, remains trapped in the language of the faithful when the issue of oppression is raised; a language that finds no resonance outside its followers. The same holds true with the fundamentalist types of Evangelical groups. In the Eritrean case, it gets suicidal when the Evangelical Churches wouldn’t even allow themselves to say anything against the regime even as it seeks their annihilation, simply because the Book (as they interpret it) tells them not to do so. The irony is that it is in this sense that the phrase “trapped in the language of the faithful” as applied to Evangelical groups in Eritrea gets it literal interpretation. In contrast, the Catholic Church (as some other Churches in the West) has learned how to “talk” in a humanitarian language without evangelization or domination in its mind.

Following this tradition of social activism, The Eritrean Catholic Church has also managed to establish its own tradition within the 23 years of lifespan of the new nation. The first one titled “Peace and Prosperity” was written right after independence in 1991, when everyone was so elated that no one dared to criticize Shaebia. One of the themes they discussed in that Pastoral Letter was, “What did we learn from the past?” That the idea of putting the past under scrutiny, an anathema to the Eritrean elite even now, did occur to the Catholic Church so early is to be applauded. In the same letter, it also spoke out against the massive laying off in many departments of the government. Given that was the first step Shaebia took in monopolizing every aspect of the government and that almost all the vacated places were filled in by teghadelti, we can only appreciate the foresight of the Catholic Church in this matter. The second Pastoral Letter titled “God Loves the Nation” was written right after the border war and when the G-15 crisis was brewing in 2001. After being very blunt on what the ramifications of that war would be, they stressed on the importance of peaceful resolution. And it is also in this letter that they tackle the causes of the exodus for the first time, “There is no point in just asking the question, ‘Why are our youth choosing to go abroad?’ – for no one leaves a country of milk and honey to seek another country offering the same opportunities. If one's homeland is a place of peace, jobs and freedom of expression there is no reason to leave it to suffer hardship, loneliness and exile in an effort to look for opportunity elsewhere” (quoted again in their latest letter [13]) And the third Pastoral Letter was written on Independence Day of May 25, 2014, when the meaning of independence had to be revisited in light of the existential crisis that has reached at its most critical stage, “How can we speak about the independence and the dignity of a nation without presupposing the dignity and independence of the people? It is no longer a question of a standard of life more or less comfortable but of the problem of living or not living …” [14]

There are two “generalizing” tendencies among those who are reacting to the Pastoral Letter that keep blunting the message, exploiting two facts that can be read ambiguously: first, that this a routine act of the Church and, second, that it is addressed to “all of us”.

There might be some who claim that the Eritrean Catholic Church, in writing the 2014 Pastoral Letter, is doing what it has been doing before; that is, this is business as usual. I doubt that this is true, given that it has taken it 13 years (since 2001) to write a Pastoral Letter of this magnitude to address Eritreans. If so, more than anything else, it has to do with the urgency of the matter. Notice that in all the cases of three pastoral letters addressed to the people, the timings are crucial: first, immediately after independence, second after the border war; and, third, when the mass exodus has reached a critical stage. In light of all this, to say that it is business as usual not only is it non-informative, but also takes the bite off the message. [By reiterating the “business as usual” explanation, some of the priests abroad are also falling into the same trap.] Therefore, even though the fact that these Pastoral Letters came out three times puts them within a context of a tradition, the fact that they came out on crucial times (say, as opposed to every year) ties them to prevailing conditions in Eritrea in intimate ways.

Another generalizing way of blunting the message is by saying that it is addressed to all of us; that is, as if it takes all of us accountable for the tragedy in equal measure. That is not true, even though all of us are to be blamed, it is not lost on the Bishops where the great blame lies. When they encourage the parents to take control of their families, despite the negative forces militating against them, and coax the youth to bring an end to the no-peace-no-war situation, instead of fleeing the nation, the solution they have in mind are no less radical than those entertained by the opposition.

If the above makes sense, what we should ask now is: what is it that has caused the Bishops to write the Pastoral Letter at this point in time?

The inspiration factor

Even though we have seen how the Catholic bishops and priests in Eritrea could draw inspiration from a history of social activism of the Church outside of Eritrea in general, in this particular case the main inspiration seems to have come from the Pope. The Pope’s power emanates not only from the institutional position of his office in the Vatican, but also from being a source of inspiration to hundreds of millions of Catholic masses all over the word. The four Bishops who penned the Pastoral Letter are no exception. In one impassioned speech that Pope Francis gave at Lampedussa in a Mass commemorating the death of thousands of Africans in the Mediterranean Sea, many of whom were Eritreans, he said [15]:

“‘Where is your brother?’ His blood cries out to me, says the Lord. This is not a question directed to others; it is a question directed to me, to you, to each of us. These brothers and sisters of ours were trying to escape difficult situations to find some serenity and peace; they were looking for a better place for themselves and their families, but instead they found death. ... I recently listened to one of these brothers of ours. Before arriving here, he and the others were at the mercy of traffickers, people who exploit the poverty of others, people who live off the misery of others. How much these people have suffered! Some of them never made it here.”

We can see where the theme of “Where is your brother?” in the Pastoral Letter came from. But that doesn’t mean the entire agency behind the Pastoral Letter has to be attributed to the Vatican. The genius of the Pastoral Letter is that the four Bishops used the inspiration that addressed a particular Eritrean tragedy, the tragedy at Lampedusa, and applied it to the larger context of a people in existential crisis. Perhaps we could put it this way: they took the drowning of the ship carrying hundreds Eritreans in the Mediterranean Sea as a metaphor for an ailing nation drowning likewise. And that is exactly how inspirations should work; it wouldn’t count as inspiration if it ends up in imitation. In fact, it is Pope Francis himself that advices, “it is up to the Christian communities to analyze with objectivity the situation which is proper to their own country”. [16] In this regard, it helps to realize that the Bishops happen to be the most powerful in practical terms in their diocese, given that they are the closest to the people among the decision makers in the hierarchy and hence entirely responsible for pastoral messages addressed to the laity in their domains. And that is exactly what the Pastoral Letter displays in its nuanced message, with rich and detailed local context.

The beauty of the “Where is your brother?” text going locality-specific, as dexterously applied by the Bishops, is that it emboldens us the readers too to adopt it in novel ways within the Eritrean context, where one meets this phenomenon first and foremost within the family unit itself. After all, in the Bible, this phenomenon takes place within the confines of the family, lending its literal interpretation to its Eritrean counterpart. Here is one of Pope Francis’ excellent metaphors that could be easily applied to the Eritrean context, with a twist that is uniquely Eritrean [17]:

“‘Where is your brother?’ Who is responsible for this blood? In Spanish literature we have a comedy of Lope de Vega which tells how the people of the town of Fuente Ovejuna kill their governor because he is a tyrant. They do it in such a way that no one knows who the actual killer is. So when the royal judge asks: ‘Who killed the governor?’, they all reply: ‘Fuente Ovejuna, sir’. Everybody and nobody! Today too, the question has to be asked: Who is responsible for the blood of these brothers and sisters of ours? Nobody! That is our answer: It isn’t me; I don’t have anything to do with it; it must be someone else, but certainly not me …”

When Shaebia knocks at the doors of each family to take away their teenage sons and daughters, a habit it had perfected at mieda, the parents don’t dare ask, “Where are you taking my children?” And once the nuclear family disintegrates this way, it is easy to see why members of the family get estranged from one another, after which it becomes easy for any one of them to say “Am I the keeper of my brother?” or “Am I the keeper of my father?” Thus, it is when the estranged children, now totally appropriated by Shaebia in the national service, come back to the doorsteps of their parents to return the favor that the “everybody and nobody” metaphor works to perfection.

When parents are detained for the “crime” of their sons or daughters that have deserted the army or evaded conscription, not only do those sons and daughters still serving in the army never raise their voices in protest, they do the arresting themselves. If you ask a Warsai whether he has ever arrested his parents, he would definitely respond with an emphatic no, totally oblivious of the division of labor that has allowed him to do so with clear conscience. Sure enough the likelihood that someone would be ordered to arrest his parents is probably zero; but what difference would that make if he ends up arresting another Warsai’s parents, given that the other Warsai will do likewise to someone else’s parents; and so on until one day he decides to flee the country and an anonymous Warsai shows up at his house soon thereafter to arrest his parents. Indeed then, in the “Fuente Ovejuna” manner, when a Warsai is asked of his detained father, “Where is your father?”, he would reply, “Certainly, not me”, which directly translates into, “Am I the keeper of my father?” That is why, I say, that in Eritrea’s case we don’t even have to venture outside the family to see the morale of this powerful metaphor. But if we do, we will find it everywhere in the land, in the ghedli tradition that goes back 50 years deep.

The existential crisis

There is no doubt that the Catholic Bishops have made the existential crisis that the nation faces central to the message of their Pastoral Letter. Neither the other religious denominations nor the opposition groups have ever raised the issue of extinction, let alone to make it central to their message. Wherefrom comes this foresight of the Catholic Bishops?

In addition to the inspirational factors mentioned above, the Eritrean Catholic Church is uniquely positioned to witness the existential predicament in its evidential sense at its two ends: the mass exodus looked at from Eritrea, where it starts, and from Italy, where it ends. As waves and waves of Eritrean migrants have been landing in Europe, sometimes with dire consequences along their journey, the Vatican had been at the forefront in highlighting their plight. I am sure that the Eritrean Catholic Church has its representatives in the Vatican that inform it of all that takes place at the European end of the mass exodus. In addition, there are Eritreans from the Church, like Abba Mussie Zerai and Sister Azezet Habtezghi Kidane, who have been doing their utmost in bringing the plight of Eritrean migrants in the Mediterranean, the Sinai and Israel to the attention of the world; there can be no doubt that they too have compiled substantial information in all these regards. Thus, in general, the Catholic Church in Eritrea must have been well informed of what is happening at the other end of the mass exodus. But what is more important than the observation from abroad, and perhaps invaluable to their current awareness, is the observation from inside: what the Bishops have been witnessing in their alarmingly ever-dwindling parishes.

Even though the mass exodus is now to be witnessed all over Eritrea, there is no doubt that it is Kebessa that has been hit very hard, as it is being hollowed out of its demographic center at an alarming rate: hundreds of thousands have already left the nation for good, and many more are on a similar move. And within Kebessa, it is the most urbanized and educated part that was hit first, although the rest is catching up fast. And the Catholic community in Eritrea happens to be one of the most urbanized and educated section. That is to say, the “desolation” and “barrenness” caused by this mass exodus must have been particularly felt in this community first. And there is no better place to witness this than in the premises of Catholic churches.

Unlike the Tewahdo Church, the Catholic Church happens to be an efficient institution that documents everything in its domain: the population of its followers, the parishioners attending each church, the age demographics in its parishes, the births, marriages and deaths in each parish, etc. Besides, the fact that the Catholic Church runs many schools and clinics gives it additional tool by which to assess the population decline. For instance, it would be easy for them to see where the Church is heading in the near future by looking at the number of Catholic kids attending their kindergartens or at the number of infants born to a certain parish. From all of these records, it would be easy to draw a down-spiraling graph that depicts where the Church is heading demographics-wise. I suspect that the dire warnings of the Bishops of a “desolate” country and of “extinction” (tsanta) in the making come from these solid facts gathered from their daily experiences within their respective dioceses.

Thus, this heightened sense of urgency that we don’t see among others, including the clueless opposition, is to be seen among the Catholic Church because, among other things, it has been able to take a glimpse of the abyss of extinction ahead of others in all its demographic forewarnings; that is, even though the Tewahdo population has been walking in tandem with the Catholic population towards that existential abyss.

The disintegration of the family

When the Bishops lament about the disintegration of the family, as its children get dispersed in the “national service, military, tehadso boot camps, prisons” and, we might add, in refugee camps and beyond, scattered all over the world, there is not the slightest doubt that they are pointing the accusatory finger at the regime. But the question that the Bishops understandably don’t raise is: Where did this regime pick up this habit? What is this alien culture that is causing havoc to the nuclear family?

Zekre Lebona goes to the crux of the matter when he attributes “Ask Not Where Your Brother Is” to ghedli operatives [18], where the convoluted state of mind that prevailed then was: the concern for fellow others could only be had by taking away from the concern that one had for ghedli or “Eritrea”. Once this mass deprivation reigns, the culture of accountability is lost for good: nobody can blame anybody, because everybody is to be blamed, either through participation or inaction. In the 50 years of ghedli insanity, we witness one purge after another, where others standby and watch as others perish, at best, or participate in the purging, at worst, until their turn arrives. And when that time arrives, they are met with that same climate of indifference or hostility. And so it goes on and on in a chain of action and reaction (or absence thereof) for 50 odd years, until the masses arrive at the existential abyss. In a land where being a hero at the latest hour exempts you from being accountable for all your former crimes, it is easy to see how the question of who is accountable for the crimes of the past gets the resounding answer, “everybody and nobody”.

But this culture of indifference is not to be attributed to individuals only. The best example to see how this indifference works at society level – that is, when both the victims and the indifferent or collaborating ones are huge chunks of society – is to see how urban Eritrra reacted when rural Eritrea was subjected to forceful conscription (giffa) that caused havoc to their societies for more than decade in ghedli era, the same way indefinite national service is causing havoc to both urban and rural Eritrea now. During those years of horror, when tens of thousands of peasants were herded with the barrel of the gun behind them all the way to Sahel, their families disintegrated and their villages gutted out, the urbanites didn’t acknowledge that this was take place let alone to protest. And in those few cases where there was acknowledgement, they taught it was a sacrifice needed for the sake of “Eritrea”. In fact, the road of extinction didn’t start with the national service but with ghedli, not only in its conceptual but also in its demographic sense. It was only that there was no one to document it.

We can also apply this culture of indifference to the religious denominations themselves, as applied to one another. When Shaebia conducted an all out assault against Jehovah Witnesses in 1993, none of the other religions uttered a whimper of protest. Then came the assaults on Muslim conservatives, on the Evangelical Churches and the Tewahdo Church, in that order. As one is religion is isolated and attacked, the others watched by in indifference. And in all this, the Catholic Church is no exception. If so, given the deeply spiritual aspect of the “Where Is Your Brother” admonishment, above all else it applies to the religions themselves.

How did the people of our land known for feriha-egziabiher and adi-highi lose the concern they had for one another as fellow individuals (as family members, friends, parishioners, neighbors, citizens, etc)? We will find the answer in the culture of ghedli where the revolution took it as its central task to fray the lateral links that bonded individuals to one another – familial, cultural, religious, historical, adi, etc – so that they would establish only vertical bonds with Shaebia or “Eritrea”.

There is no doubt then what has been causing havoc in Eritrea is primarily the culture of ghedli, which cannot coexist with other cultures, and hence necessarily seeks their demise for it to flourish. For instance, there is no way that national service could have lasted this long and in such magnitude without the disintegration of the family. If the Warsai generation is to be molded in the image of teghadalay, then it is necessary that the kids be taken away from the family for the acculturation process to effectively work. Such isolation is needed not only to wean them from the influence of the family, but also from that of the civilian world in general – cultural, religious, historical, educational, civic, etc. True to its nihilist philosophy, Shaebia believes that the youth could be made part of the Shaebia family only if they are freed from the “trappings” of their nuclear families; the two types of families cannot be made to exist with one another.

The same holds true when it comes with the youth and religion. Shaebia believes that the relation the youth hold with their respective religions can be sustained only by taking away from their relation with Shaebia (or “Eritrea”). Part of the reason why the regime has been so hostile to “new” religions (the Evangelical Churches), so much so that it has been actively seeking their annihilation from the land, is because they happen to be the most successful among the religions in attracting the youth. That also explains why it turned its guns towards the reformist wing of the Tewahdo Church.

It is worthwhile to note that, at the beginning, the Isaias regime had no qualms whatsoever over the reformist agenda of the Tewahdo Church. It was only after grasping the inroads that the Church was making among the youth that it became alarmed. This was, indeed, too much for Shaebia to swallow, an organization that believes it has a monopoly over the youth of Eritrea. In fact, we can see that every single move the despot made against the Tewahdo Church was done with the control of the youth in his mind: First, he arrested all the learned clergy that were at the forefront of the reformation of the Orthodox Church, and hence, the driving force behind the youth's newly found interest in the Church. Second, he ordered the closure of the Sunday school at Medhanie Alem Church, which was turning out to be a magnet to thousands of youth. Third, he decided to do away with the Patriarch who was unwilling to meet his demands, thus clearly coming on the way between Shaebia and the youth. Fourth, he abruptly switched sides to support the non-reformist wing of the Church, whose mark of resistance to change is best exemplified in its reluctance to use the vernacular language, a stance that would surely drive away most of the youth from the Church. And, last, the clergy were made to carry firearms, with the goal of acculturating the youth serving the Church in the culture of ghedli. [19]

If the above makes sense, the only way the family could reinstate its values is when it successfully wrestles back its authority over its members from the clutches of Shaebia; and only then would the regeneration of the Eritrean society can begin in earnest. It is within this light that we have to see the Bishops’ courageous advice to parents never to abdicate their responsibilities to the negative forces in the effort to save the family, and that the salvation of the society would be unthinkable without salvaging the family.

The time factor

Time is everything in Eritrea’s case. One need only look at the nation’s present predicament to see how time is the most important factor in the existential equation that is now haunting Eritrea. As pointed above, already hundreds of thousands have left the nation for good and hundreds of thousands more are on the move; and there is no end in sight to this outflow of stampeding humanity so far as Shaebia remains at the helm of power. If this regime survives for few more years, there won’t be any nation left for anyone to liberate. We have to remember that the sense of urgency of the Pastoral Letter mainly comes from this fact that takes the time factor seriously. Yet, sadly, it is clear that these moral admonishments only won’t do the job.

The tragedy of the existential disaster that is facing Eritrea now is that its solution would mainly come from outside, rendering the moral factor on its own almost epiphenomenal. How many of us do really expect that as a result of moral improvements in the way Eritreans do things will slow down the mass exodus, let alone stop it? For morality to do its job in Eritrea, it would require a time frame that the existential crisis cannot afford. So, if moral outrage is going to work, it is not through the incremental process in each and everyone’s heart, but rather by abruptly bringing an end to the Isaias regime. Why so?

The end of the mass exodus depends on a technical rather than moral or political decision. Even after the fall of the Isaias regime, the likelihood that this nation of ours will turn into “a land of milk and honey” soon enough to stem the mass exodus is slim. But what the fall of the Isaias regime will do is take away the only pull factor (other than the push factors inside the country) that is driving the outflow: the fact that the asylum-seeking refugees are being accepted as asylants in the West. Neither those who claim indefinite national service nor those who claim religious persecution will have any ground for acceptance after the fall of the regime. If so, the only way we could relevantly cash out the moral admonishments of the Bishops is if it culminates in bringing regime change in the land. Let me elaborate on this point by going back to the issue of the disintegration of the family.

Even if the parents in Eritrea develop the morale backbone that the Pastoral Letter demands of them and decide to take control of their families, how are they supposed to do that? Unless they have their children under the same roof, how are they supposed to influence them morally or otherwise? Notice how even this goes technical on its solution: on cannot blame parents for the misbehavior of their children who no more live with them; it would be like asking parents in ghedli era to morally influence their children who had already joined ghedli. So the first in line in the procedural order is for parents own their children, and only then could we talk of the parents’ role having a sobering effect on their children. And the only way the parents could own their children is if they literally stop the regime from taking them away from the home. If they succeed in doing that, it would be the end of national service, a decisive step that would necessarily bring the no-peace-no-war situation to an end. But the problem so far has been that when parents have had it with Shaebia, they have been taking the same route of “passive resistance” as their children has been doing: instead of aiming to bring this no-peace-no-war to an end (that the bishops vigorously propose), they have been condoning their children’s mass exodus, be it in implicit or explicit ways. When the problem doubles as a solution this way, a vicious circle is set in motion, with no end in sight.

The same holds true when it comes to the Bishops’ moral admonishments in regard to the no-peace-no-war situation:

“We might realistically ask ourselves if this situation of ‘neither peace nor war’, which we have lived for some time, has not brought us to the present position. So, what is missing? Is it political will or the lack of an actual possibility of bringing it to an end? If the international community has not yet played its part in this regard, and given that every individual is the first one responsible for the solution of his own problems, it is in the interests of the injured party to assume in primis the initiative for his own release. This does not take away from the fact that whoever holds a role of responsibility has the obligation to ask our youth – rather than condemn them to the exploiters and human traffickers – if it is it not better to identify ways and strategies for getting out of this absurd situation of ‘neither peace nor war’? In so far as such a desire is conspicuously lacking, so it is that thousands of young men and women, attracted by the prospect of even a minimum of freedom, dignity and quality of life risk themselves in a desperate race against torture and death” [20]

For those who blame the Bishops for not having said enough, I advise them to read this paragraph again and again. They don’t have to read between the lines either, for this as direct as it could possibly get. When they oblige us to ask the youth, “if it is it not better to identify ways and strategies for getting out of this absurd situation of ‘neither peace nor war’”, they are laying it squarely on the shoulders of the youth to bring this no-peace-no-war situation to an end. And when they say this, they realize there is no other way of doing that than by bringing regime change.

Conclusion

What is most appealing of the Pastoral Letter is that the message is not Catholic-specific, in that the existential calamity that it addresses doesn’t stalk the Catholic community only, but the entire nation, in general, and the Kebessa community, in particular. That is to say, by focusing on issues that has deeply devastated the population, the Bishops have made it impossible for the regime to isolate them. And this is exactly what is scaring the regime stiff, for its vulgar pragmatism is of no help to it in this matter.

We have to remember that so far there hasn’t been any community-wide resistance against the regime. The reason why Shaebia dreads that day is that, given the palpable anger of the masses, any strong reaction from a sizable community would trigger others to follow soon. That is why Shaebia has so far been not crazy enough to aggravate the Catholic Church beyond a certain point; not because of what the Catholic community may do on its own, but that once started there would be no stopping the chain reaction it may trigger. Shaebia’s sober assessment, true to its vulgar pragmatism, is based from gauging the high discontent level among the masses that has reached a critical mass. But even if Shaebia restrains itself from taking this road to its self destruction, there is another factor that could equally trigger this chain reaction over which it has no control: a little shove from outside.

Even though the Pastoral Letter has shown the way, it doesn’t necessarily mean that either the parents or their sons and daughters will rise up on their own. The masses will rise only if they see the regime at its most vulnerable point. There is no doubt though a little shove from outside would be enough to render Shaebia’s vulnerability visible for anyone to see – one that would give the population enough courage to rise up. The only nation strategically positioned to provide that “little shove”, in all its geopolitical sense, is Ethiopia. Geographically, it is there, looming large. Interest-wise, it has much to lose if anarchy reigns in Eritrea. What is lacking is the will to act before it is too late.

Reference

[1] Eritrean Catholic Bishops; Where Is Your Brother? (The Most Daring Message to Come Out of Eritrea; June 07, 2014; asmarino.com); Easter (2014); Asmara, Eritrea.

[2] Ibid, sec 17 & 18.

[3] AMECAE; The Prophetic Voice of the Catholic Bishops of Eritrea; June 16, 2014; asmarino.com. And Habtemariam, Semere; Pastoral Letter: a Complete and Literal Translation; June 19; 2014; awate.com.

[4] Interview with Abba Mekonnen Amanuel on the Pastoral Letter of the four Catholic Bishops, June 16, 2014; assenna.com.

[5] Ghebrehiwet, Yosief; (I) Kebessa Eritrea’s Suicide Mission from Sahel to 3Lampedusa: The Other War, Nov 08, 2013; and Disowning Eritrea: Owning the Regal Disease (II - Kebessa Eritrea’s Suicide Mission), May 02, 2014; asmarino.com.

[6] Belloni, Milena; It’s April, which means Eritrea’s refugees are headed north; April 05, 2014; Global Post.

[7] Connell, Dan; Eritrean Refugees at Risk; April 11, 2014; asmarino.com.

[8] Ghebrehiwet, Yosief; Tewahdos’ Complicity in the Demise of their Church; may 2008; asmarino.com

[9] Serray; In the comment section of: the Awate Team; Eritrean Catholic Bishops Ask: “Where Is Your Brother?”; June 07, 2014; awate.com.

[10] Pope: Church in Ethiopia, Eritrea a witness to unity; Vatican Radio, May 09, 2014.

[11] Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Noverum; 1891; vatican.vat.

[12] Liberation Theology finds new welcome under Pope Francis’ Vatican; Sep 09, 2013; religiousnews.com

[13] AMECAE; The Prophetic Voice of the Catholic Bishops of Eritrea; sec 19.

[14] AMECAE; The Prophetic Voice of the Catholic Bishops of Eritrea; esc 25.

[15] Francis in Lampedusa: “Cain, Where Is Your Brother”; July 14, 2013; opusdei.org.uk

[16] AMECAE; The Prophetic Voice of the Catholic Bishops of Eritrea; sec 21.

[17] Francis in Lampedusa: “Cain, Where Is Your Brother”; ibid.

[18] Lebona, Zekre; The Eritrean Revolution’s Rule of Conduct: Ask Not Where Your Brother Is; June 13, 2014; asmarino.com.

[19] Ghebrehiwet, Yosief; The Despot Playing It Safe with Patriarch Antonios; 2005; asmarino.com.

[20] AMECAE; The Prophetic Voice of the Catholic Bishops of Eritrea; sec 20.