To Solve the Ethiopian Eritrean Conflict a Change in the Psyche of the Power Elites Is Essential

To Solve the Ethiopian Eritrean Conflict a Change in the Psyche of the Power Elites Is Essential

The conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia is mainly rooted in the common psyche of the power elites rather than the existence of objective irreconcilable differences. The elites of Ethiopia and Eritrea share a common psyche because they share a common culture and tradition.  The common psychic traits of the two power elite groups are hurt pride, beleaguered nationalism and zero sum mentality.

Eritreans and Ethiopians are one people.  Sadly and paradoxically, their common history, culture and psyche, instead of being the foundation of their unity, have become an artificial barrier between them. Particularly Eritreans and Ethiopians in their late 50s and 60s, who are the main actors in this sad drama, are deeply scarred and traumatized by the development of this conflict.  Like two chess players who follow the same strategy, they have cornered themselves into a stalemate.

Eritrea and Ethiopia, for over thirty years, fought one of the most brutal and destructive civil wars in African history. Within two years of reorganizing as two independent states, instead of mobilizing their meager resources to rebuild their war-ravaged economies and feeding their famine-stricken people, they savagely fought over a border demarcation at a cost of over one hundred thousand lives.  For twenty years and counting, the two regimes have been dancing a no war, no peace tango choreographed as proxy wars, political and economic sabotage, and diplomatic games.

This conflict has overshadowed issues of economic sustenance and governance for which the people of these two states have struggled and sacrificed. This conflict is one of the most intractable political currents pushing the Horn of Africa into the abyss of failed states.

This conflict can be resolved only by changing the psyche of the two countries’ elites. This could start as a grassroots movement of people-to-people rapprochement.  The people are the ones who have true vested interests in peaceful coexistence.

Hurt pride

Eritreans and Ethiopians have a deep sense of pride and will go far and work long to retaliate for actual or perceived slights to their pride.

Eritrea’s case: Eritrea was a former Italian colony in transition as a British protectorate. In 1951 Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia by a United Nations (UN) mandate. In 1960s, when the rest of Africa’s colonies marched to independence, Emperor Haile Selassie unilaterally abrogated the federation and reduced Eritrea to a province in his empire state. Eritreans cried foul. First by peaceful means and then by armed struggle, they sought to get the UN to revisit its mandate, but to no avail. This forced union deeply offended Eritrean pride. To make matters worse, the Haile Selassie regime and the military dictatorship that followed it pursued a scorched earth policy in waging war on Eritrea for over thirty years. The Haile Selassie regime was fully armed and aided by the United States and the Derg by the now defunct Soviet Union. The Eritrean people’s struggles and suffering were mostly ignored by the international community. Journalists who mentioned it called it the hidden war. It is a testimonial to the indomitable spirit of the Eritreans who endured so much hardship and made so much sacrifice that they won their war without any significant help from the outside world. Moreover, when Eritrea emerged in the conflict-ridden Horn of Africa stage as an independent state, it was treated as a pariah by its neighbors and as intransigent by the international community. This poured salt into Eritrean wounded pride. Their reaction has been to obstinately withdraw as much as possible from the world stage.

Ethiopia’s case: Part of the Ethiopian polity claims a birthright to the legendary ancient empire that extended from the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean deep into the jungles of Africa which flourished for a thousand years until it was reduced to a tiny kingdom on the rugged central highland escarpments by the encroachment of first Islam and later European colonialists. The schools and media have inculcated this myth and hailed emperors Menelik and Haile Selassie as restorers of the legendary great Ethiopian empire. When Eritreans started their armed struggle in earnest, the adherents of “Great Ethiopia” felt snubbed.   Like a suitor who was rebuffed by his dream woman, their reaction was hateful and vengeful. The acts of atrocities committed by the Ethiopian army in Eritrea were reprehensible. There was no effort to assuage Eritrean grievances and hardly any effort at peaceful settlement. The bitter conflict raged over decades and was settled on the battle field.

The exception to this was the support of the Ethiopian students and the left who looked at the Eritrean liberation struggle as a trail blazer pointing to a need for their own struggle against the feudal order and the fascist military junta.

The brightest moment in the history of the two states was when the Eritrean people affirmed their choice through peaceful referendum and the magnanimous acceptance by Ethiopians of the Eritreans’ vote for independence. This fraternal spirit was short lived when some revanchist elements in the opposition and some within the EPRDF started castigating the EPRDF leadership as traitors. These revanchists argued that it was the EPRDF leadership which accepted the result and not the Ethiopian people. This is far from the truth, because, if the Ethiopian people were opposed to closing this bitter chapter of their history, they would have expressed their dissension during or shortly after the referendum when the nascent EPRDF couldn’t have stopped it.  Despite the lack of a reasonable basis to the revanchists’ position, they succeeded in pushing the EPRDF to take an intransigent stance towards Eritrea to prove that it is the true defender of Ethiopian interests.  The EPLF responded true to character by rushing to confrontation. This paved the way to a savage war that cost the lives of over 100,000 people, displacement of millions more, and destruction of infrastructure worth over half billion dollars.

There is an Amharic saying which succinctly describes the folly of vain pride. “kit gelbo ras tekenanbo” baring your ass to cover your head. What is hurting the pride of Eritreans and Ethiopians is abject poverty, underdevelopment and poor governance. Empty and abrasive nationalism is no solution.

Historically, if both sides had reacted to each other’s grievances thoughtfully and had settled their differences through political give and take, both people and states would have been spared colossal suffering and destruction and there wouldn’t be lingering animosity between these kindred people that has lasted for generations.

Beleaguered Nationalism

Both Eritrea and Ethiopia are made up of many ethnic groups and nationalities. Owing to their rudimentary socio-economic development, they lack internal social integration and cohesion. The raging political issues of the time are the identity of these nationalisms – Greater Ethiopia nationalism, Eritrean nationalism, nationalism of the constituent nationalities, the expression of these nationalisms and above all the content of these nationalisms.

National identities of Ethiopia and Eritrea are mostly expressed when the countries are confronted by external forces. Left alone, each country descends into internecine conflicts. Quite often when the internal discord becomes strong, the leaders of both states increase their belligerent propaganda and fan the flames of military confrontation against their neighbors in order to whip up nationalism. One of the reasons both governments are less amenable to peaceful and constructive solutions is because the emotional turmoil that underlies this conflict serves as a diversion from the essential issues of economic wellbeing and governance in both states. However, this miscalculated strategy of exploiting external conflict to avoid resolving internal problems is fraught with grave consequences.

Ethiopia’s case: Ethiopians’ united resistance against Italian fascist invasion in the 1940s and their victory against the Somali invasion in the 1970s were potent expressions of Ethiopian nationalism. Nonetheless, the fundamental issue, the linchpin of the main political struggle between those in power versus those in opposition, is the question of Ethiopia’s national identity and the foundation of its governance. Is Ethiopia a monolithic nation or at least an entity that could be molded into one?  Or is it an amalgam of nations, nationalities and ethnic groups? Are the peoples’ democratic rights best expressed under a unitary state or under an ethnic federation? Essentially, what do the people want? How do they express their allegiance?

Haile Selassie’s regime tried to mold one Ethiopian nation by imposing the highland Christian culture, Amharic language and an edifice of absolute monarchy. His mission was met with stiff resistance from Eritreans in the north, Somali to the east and Tigray and Oromo in the center. After diligently stomping out ethnic uprisings in every corner of the state for over fifty years, the regime finally met its demise. The Derg regime tried to maintain the unitary state under its brutal military dictatorship while allowing and promoting ethnic cultural and linguistic diversity. This approach utterly failed to satisfy the surging demand for ethnic self-determination. The Derg was crushed by a united force of ethnic regional forces led by the EPLF and EPRDF.

EPRDF reconstituted Ethiopia as an ethnic federation. Ethnicity is not merely cultural expression but the basis of political organization and administration. This is a bold experiment, albeit a highly controversial one. Many predicted its instant demise and calamitous consequences for the Ethiopian state, yet the state is still standing and thriving.  History will judge how it fares against its predecessors.  Time will tell what trajectory the political development will follow.

As noble and inspiring as it is to try to find a new basis for political confluence, it is being undermined by EPRDF’s own authoritarian rule, obsessive centralization, and suppression of political dialogue and participation. Resolving these issues is by far more important for the future of Ethiopia than scoring points against Eritrea.

Eritrea’s case: The enduring expression of Eritrean nationalism is the tenacious struggle for independence. Eritrea, like the rest of African states, is a haphazard creation of colonial occupation that resulted in a conglomeration of different ethnic groups, religions and regions. However, they have stood united against British efforts to parcel them and lump them with their neighboring states, Sudan and Ethiopia. Christians and Muslims, highlanders and lowlanders, regardless of their ethnic origins and faiths, struggled as one for the exercise of their inherent rights.  After thirty years of fighting, they prevailed. They have stood defiantly as an independent state in the conflict ridden Horn of Africa for the last twenty years. Anyone who would bet against the viability of the Eritrean state would lose.

In Eritrea, as In Ethiopia, identity and expression of nationalism is a major issue. Is Eritrea a nation state or a sum of nationalities? How would democracy be best enjoyed: under a unitary state or as union of nationalities? The EPLF/EPDJ answer to that is suspension of any political dialogue on the grounds of a permanent state of war with Ethiopia. Suppression of rights on whatever grounds risks alienation and opposition, both peaceful and violent. The current political tension in Eritrea is a manifestation of this alienation.

If Eritrea staggers and its people get frustrated and disillusioned as many post-colonial African states have, it is not an expression of regret that they gained independence, but rather disapproval of their political leadership. In spite of these divides, if Eritreans feel their independence is threatened, they will unite.  However, uniting against an external threat makes the struggle for individual rights more protracted.

Zero Sum Mentality

Owing to scarcity of resources and opportunities in this part of the world, settlements of conflicts between entities is seldom based on peaceful win-win solutions. One side’s gain is always regarded as the other side’s loss. Negotiations, be it between ethnic groups, villages, political parties or individuals, are conducted with such shrewdness, secrecy and quest for advantage that they would make Machiavelli look like a novice.  That is the experience that has amazed travelers, diplomats and scholars who have studied Abyssinian history and culture over the ages. That is what has baffled and frustrated international mediators.

The first rule of engagement is to eliminate your enemy, if needs be by force. If stalemate is created, negotiate for détente. Once détente is created, work diligently to undermine and weaken your enemy. When the enemy is sufficiently weakened, apply the coup de grace.

Ethiopia’s case: Let us examine the policy of Ethiopia towards Eritrea under three regimes.

Haile Selassie had an opportunity to build a stable union. He had the partial support of Eritrean population. If, instead of abrogating the democratic rights of the Eritreans, he had respected the Federal Mandate and extended those rights to the rest of Ethiopia, a perfect union might have been achieved. But that was too much to expect from an absolute monarch. He chose a scorched earth policy. Instead of crushing the Eritrean resistance, the hardships he caused made them more resolved and united in their struggle.

The fascist military Derg was not any better disposed than Haile Selassie to sharing of political power. Therefore, they offered the Eritrean forces nothing in terms of a negotiated settlement. Backed by the defunct Soviet Union, the Derg unleashed the full force of the largest army in Sub-Sahara Africa to crush the deeply entrenched Eritrean liberation forces. Its brutal repression in the cities drove the highland urbanites into the fold of the struggle. Only in its death throes, pushed by its Soviet enablers, did the Derg agree to sit at the negotiating table. By then it was too late. The nature of these two despotic regimes is the most important factor why the Eritrean and Ethiopian conflict failed to have a peaceful resolution

The EPRDF, it can be alleged, is trying to achieve by diplomatic maneuvers what its predecessors failed by military might: rollback of Eritrea’s’ independence through political isolation, economic sanctions and fomenting of internal opposition. The EPRDF played its political cards effectively to position Ethiopia as a strategic ally of the US, as one of the main power brokers in the African Union and a hegemon in the Horn of Africa.

After the 1998 war between Eritrea and Ethiopia was stalemated, the EPRDF crafted a no war, no peace strategy. The calculation is that Ethiopia as the larger state can outlast Eritrea in weathering the cost of prolonged war mobilization. It reneged on its commitment to abide by the binding Algiers Arbitration. It deported

Ethiopian citizens of Eritrean origin with the intention of creating an economic burden on Eritrea. This was not only a gross violation of human rights but a shortsighted tactic that severed one of the basic fibers that tied the two fraternal people. Ethiopia is used as staging ground for opposition forces. Although an adroit politician, Meles Zenawe could not keep his views secret. He publicly stated in 2012 that the goal of his regime is a regime change in Eritrea.

This is the zero sum dances that are being played here over and over. It might be argued that the Ethiopian government played its cards better than the Eritrean government and scored some tactical gains, but all this comes at a strategic loss for both states and the Horn of African region at large.

Eritrea’s case: Eritrean forces didn’t invest much effort in peaceful political struggle. Their demand from the outset was independence, which left hardly any room for negotiation. Their counterpart being autocratic and fascistic regimes left hardly any room for give and take. Most importantly, they failed to reach out to opposition forces in Ethiopia. They failed to see that the Ethiopian masses were striving for a better future and better governance. They failed to reach out to Ethiopian opposition forces. They failed to see that their struggle could be resolved within the whole regional revolution.  Instead they launched their struggle within the Eritrean context alone.

When they gained independence, they failed to see how their new status affected Ethiopians psychologically, socially and economically. They failed to envision and articulate a bright future for both people in fraternal cooperation and coexistence. Instead they were dreaming of building a futuristic Eritrea without regard to their neighbor’s concerns.

When Ethiopia started flexing its muscles, Eritrea rushed to military action to gain the upper hand. When the military confrontation ended in a stalemate, Eritrea agreed to arbitration. When Ethiopia reneged on abiding by the arbitration, EPFDJ embarked on counterproductive posturing and proxy wars which aggravated the region’s conflicts.

Eritrea’s struggle started in armed confrontation and ended in armed confrontation. Not much effort was expended in political struggle and hardly any political experience has been gained either. This modus operandi reinforced the zero sum mentality of Eritrean politicians minus the sophistry of their Ethiopian counterpart. Besides, this bunker mentality has proved self-defeating.

The zero sum mentality is deeply engrained in the feudal heritage of both countries. “Us” is defined in a very narrow circumspect such as blood relations, ethnic affiliations and a narrow geographic circumference. It is based in a total distrust of groups outside of that imaginary circle that borders on schizophrenia. This fosters negativity instead of hope; dissention instead of unity; splintering instead of consolidation; conflict instead of cooperation; war instead of peace; and misery instead of happiness.

Conclusion

The Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict is based more on subjective attitudes rather than any intrinsic irreconcilable differences. Hence the first step to solving this intractable relationship is changing the psyche.

The subjective underpinnings of this conflict make solving this problem both easy and at the same time difficult. If the problem is objective and the counter parties are level headed, it is easier to find objective solutions. However, subjective differences deeply engrained in tradition take longer to change. Fortunately, there is a strong undercurrent of change.

Many members of the conflict generation are realizing the futility of this endless cycle of violence. They are self-introspecting and seeking peaceful solutions as their legacy to the new generation. The population at large is tired of paying a heavy toll for this endless conflict. The younger generation is no longer willing to be cannon fodder to empty nationalism particularly when they lack the basic rights and necessities of life.

In the past, The Eritrean and Ethiopian in diaspora have been a very important force in propagating and financing the violent conflict this is slowly changing. Those sheltered in the peace and security of democratic states who incite people for war on the home front; those loud armchair politicians, who from their cold keyboards foment outrageous conspiracy theories, those pseudo-political analysts who drum self-fulfilling prophesies and those who think their drunken orgy of insults and denigration posted on the internet is an expression of patriotism, their ranks are shrinking and their audience is dissipating.  A growing number of Eritreans and Ethiopians in diaspora who used to throw insults and sometimes punches at each other as the expression of their patriotism are finding common cause and solidarity.

Those who oppose this senseless violent conflict are the silent majority. The reason why their force has been slow in rising is because people are afraid of persecution or of being labeled unpatriotic or are simply overwhelmed by the enormity of the task. Things are changing positively.

People-to-people rapprochement is the foundation of lasting peace. As this opportunity is limited by lack of mobility and absence of a democratic platform, Eritreans and Ethiopians in diaspora could be the bridge between the two peoples. They have a common social background. They live in close proximity and share common social and cultural space. They live in a peaceful democratic arena which is conducive for starting dialogue. These people are opinion setters in their respective political and social domains. These people have started using their intellectual acumen and resources to organize conferences and forums to build bridges and heal old wounds.

The solution to the peoples’ suffering does not lie in Ethiopian territorial aggrandizement or Eritrean pipe dreams of being the economic wonder of the Horn of Africa but in living in harmony. Trying to undo what is sealed through a generation of bitter destructive war and hundreds thousands of lives on both sides is both morally unjust and counterproductive. Eritreans and Ethiopians cannot go back to the past but they can aspire to build a better future. They are better off cooperating to get rid of poverty and underdevelopment rather than striving to destroy each other. It is as simple as wishing it and acting on it as individuals, as groups, as communities and as people.

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