[AI] Asmarino Independent

Among the opposition’s doing, the most harmful thing to Eritrea has been having its current predicament identified as a political rather than existential crisis. Once misdiagnosed as a political crisis, all try to find a political solution that invariably bypasses urgent issues of survival that has little to do with politics. The reason why most Eritreans in the opposition put undue focus on the “democracy project” – creating political parties, pushing for “unity” among parties, flirting with government-in-exile, discussing on what type of democratic government is suitable to Eritrea, rallying around the constitution or amending it or condemning it, strengthening democratic institutions in Diaspora, instilling democratic culture among youth organizations, advocating for free media and other democratic rights, conducting conferences and symposiums promoting democracy, writing endless papers on the virtue of democracy, etc – for providing a solution to the current crisis of existence primarily comes from this flawed understanding.

Both the regime’s supporters and most of its detractors have this “patriotic” tendency to criminally bypass the people’s existential predicament in order to achieve some higher “national” goal; all said and done, of course, in the name of the masses. The supporters of the regime are infamously known for prioritizing land over people. All their incessant cries for “security of the nation first” have nothing to do with providing security to the people. If anything, Eritreans are more insecure now than ever – both from inside and outside. In a similar fashion, much of the opposition has been prioritizing democracy over people. The democracy proponents’ credo says it all: “The only change worth having is that of democracy” Notice the exhaustive either/or logic under which they have been working: either a regime change that ushers democracy or no regime change at all, thereby implicitly settling for the current regime to occupy the default position until they come up with a democratic solution. Given that a tailor-made change exact to their democratic specifications cannot be guaranteed ahead of time, their suicidal go-slow approach is only understandable. In both cases, however disparate they may seem in the “higher” goals they want to achieve, it is the same nationalistic drive that prioritizes ghedli-conceived “Eritrea” over the masses that explains their respective stands. In the latter case, the snail-paced, incremental pressure on the regime that they advocate is meant to assure no unexpected eventualities that may jeopardize that dream. In the meantime, both are willing to let the masses take all the beating they could, if that is what it takes to preserve the fragile “Eritrea” they harbor in their heads.

If much of the opposition is using the democracy card to delay regime change, knowingly or unknowingly, what could possibly be the motive behind it?

The here-and-now and the hereafter

I have labeled what the opposition of the peaceful type are doing as “democracy project” simply because almost everything they do revolves around democracy and democratization, to the neglect of the existential predicament that the nation finds itself now. The pervasiveness of the democracy project is inescapable. You see it dominating in almost any meeting, conference or symposium organized to tackle the Eritrean crisis, be it done by political or civic organizations: You see it in EDA meetings, in their merging, splitting and realignments. You see it in Brussels conference where, in the zeal to promote democracy, the sense of urgency that the humanitarian crisis in Eritrea calls for is lost. You see it in the reaction of most of the latter’s detractors, who invoke the most democratic term – “representation” – albeit for nonrepresentational purposes. You see it in EGS-sponsored conferences, where the emphasis has always been on democracy, especially on quam. You see it in the youth organizations that have made democracy and democratization their central issue. Even though many of these adherents of democracy are well-meaning though misguided in their prioritization of democracy, many others do it for dubious reasons.

The worst part of the democracy project is that it has become an excellent cover for all those who do not want to see the collapse of the Isaias regime now. The fact that those who oppose the sanction (or nominally support it) happen to be enthusiastic about the democracy project says it all. There are those Shaebia oriented opposition who have embraced the democracy project primarily because they don’t want to see a radical change that would jeopardize Shaebia itself, even as they want to see the tyrant go. Then there are those on the opposite end of this spectrum, who have embraced democracy for undemocratic reasons – to sneak in Sharia and Arabic and promote tribal land ownership (the obsession of the Awate group). Both see the Ethiopian factor as more threatening to the realization of their respective dreams, even as those dreams cannot coexist with one another, than the continuation of the Isaias regime. But what is more important to note is that to keep their “dreams” alive, they are willing to let the Eritrean masses languish under the brutal rule of the totalitarian regime until such time they feel it is safe for regime change – that is to say, at no time at all.

Disparate as these two groups may seem, what is important to us is their commonality: both are so obsessed with the hereafter – with life after Isaias – that they pay little attention to the here and now – how to get rid of the regime and deliver the people from the existential threat they are living under. Both are so preoccupied with preparations for the takeover that the task of regime change is relegated to the bottom of their wish list. We can then see the religious turn the “cause” has taken, as it has always been in the ghedli era. What happens on the ground, as any religious zealot would tell you, is only as good as it prepares one for the hereafter; aside from that, on its own, it has little value. Similarly, what is happening on the ground in Eritrea now has little relevance to these groups if they cannot use it for purposes of the hereafter. As in any religious cause, the “Eritrea” that these groups are trying to save can only exist by deferring it indefinitely. So, in the final end, it is not exactly democracy that they are beholden to, but the fact that the democracy project keeps deferring the realization of the “cause” – that is, the collapse of the Isaias regime – for fear that if it happens right now it might not deliver what they want.

In follow up articles, I will argue in detail why I am against the “democracy project” as embraced by the opposition in general – both by the well-meaning and not-so-well-meaning types. But before I do that, let me lay out an introductory background below by elaborating on what I mean by “existential crisis” by drawing a distinction between “normalization” and “democratization”, followed by an outline for the coming articles.

The existential crisis

As pointed above, those who are looking primarily for “political” or “democratic” solution to Eritrea’s existential predicament are doing so by ignoring the issue of existence/survival that is haunting the nation right now. Eritrea is at a death-bed, and as such it requires immediate, emergency rescue that gives us no luxury time to entertain possible scenarious. In “No Sense of Urgency among the Opposition”, I said the following regarding the existential predicament of Eritrea, pointing at the multiple places it is profusely bleeding internally:

“The horrendous damage inflicted by the Isaias regime, which in the near future may turn out to be irreversible, is now being witnessed in every aspect of the nation’s already tattered economic, social, humanitarian and political fabric: in the mass exodus of hundreds of thousands of youth, leaving behind them ghost villages, towns and cities across the nation; in the hundreds of thousands of adults indefinitely stranded in the wilderness under that misleading name of ‘national service’, deliberately made to toil in Sisyphean tasks solely designed for purposes of absolute control; in the tens of thousands of prisoners languishing in the ever-proliferating prisons and concentration camps all over Eritrea; in the killings and massacres at border crossings, underground dungeons, hard labor camps and other killing fields; in the systematic dismantling of the educational system, especially of higher learning; in the melting down of the economy, with the merchant and business class totally wiped out; in the hollowing out of the army, with its most seasoned and most educated part stampeding en mass for exit; in the utter failure of Shaebia’s ‘self-reliance’ policy and, consequently, in the severe famine it has now ushered to the country; in the government’s ‘food policy’, where food is rationed, land expropriated, peasants’ food storages looted and traditional markets rendered off limits to peasants; in the newly accelerated ‘resettlement policy’, where whole regions are to be dislodged and relocated in an agrarian design with huge social ramifications; in the remaking of the nation in Shaebia’s image, with the rule of law, culture and religion gutted out by a nihilist ‘ideology’; and, overall, in the ever-tightening totalitarian grip over the masses that has left no elbow room to breathe, let alone protest.”

If we add the regime’s terrorist excursions throughout the region that have put the nation into a permanent war footing with all its neighbors to the myriad of internal problems mentioned above, then we can see the nation’s downward spiral that would surely end in a total meltdown if left to complete its natural course. Currently, this meltdown is taking place at every imaginable sector: demographic, economic, military, educational, institutional, religious, cultural, agrarian, etc. All of this is hollowing out the nation at such a rapid rate that unless the Isaias regime is made to collapse at the earliest time possible, soon there will be little left of Eritrea worth saving.

A single example will do to see that we are running out of time to save the Eritrea of here and now (as opposed to the “Eritrea” of the hereafter that has turned out to be the pet project of the opposition): the mass exodus. Unimpressed by the “Eritrea” of the hereafter, every year tens of thousands of youth, the majority of whom are students, are fleeing the country. If this trend continues for a few more years, not only will the very context wherein democracy would be made to hold will disappear from the country (an irony that those obsessed with the democracy project need to ponder about), but the very bottom of the nation will fall out for good. Given this, our objective ought to be: how do we stop this internal bleeding now, immaterial of what comes in the hereafter.

If the above depicted characterization of what is going on in the nation is true, then the nation’s crisis is primarily that of survival, and only secondarily that of democracy. None of the existential problems mentioned above came as a result of lack of democracy, and none necessarily require democratization to resolve them. A realistic dictator or nondemocratic leader could have easily avoided all these existential trappings that Shaebia has easily fallen into. And any government that comes after the collapse of the Isaias regime – be it non-democratic, nominally democratic, dictatorship or democratic – would be able to resolve all these problems of existence at one go. All it has to do is make peace with Ethiopia, demobilize the army, drop its “self-reliance policy”, reinstitute the educational system, let the people practice whatever religion they want, let farmers and pastoralists own their land, stop interfering in the economy of the country, stop sponsoring terrorism and reverse all other draconian policies that disrupted moral life that the Asmara regime has imposed, mostly after the border crisis.

Normalization vs democratization

If the people’s crisis has primarily to do with issues of survival and not with lack of democracy, what is it that the masses actually want at this point in time? All they want is for this horror of insanity, the likes of which they have never seen before, to stop: no more famine, no more wars, no more indefinite service, no more mass exodus, no more “disappearances”, no more land expropriation, no more market regulation, no more movement restraint, no more religious persecution, no more Sawa, etc. In short: a return to a world of normalcy. That is all.

If there is a word that describes the people’s wish aptly, it would be “normalization”. They want everything to return to normal: Parents want to see their children grow up in a normal environment where they could go to school without getting swallowed up by the military machine. Peasants want to tend the land without the fear of their farmlands being confiscated or their food products looted. Merchants want to trade in free markets without all kinds of interference from the government; without the fear of being bankrupted by PFDJ’s economic arm. Parishioners want to worship their God whichever way they want without the fear of being persecuted. Grown up adults want to work in a normal job, marry while they are young and raise a family. And so on. … Everyone wants to lead a normal life; period. The old Habesha kings’ proclamation, “harestay hires, negaday niged” says it all – a proof that democracy is not necessarily needed to go back to a world of normalcy. “Normalization” is the default position where both totalitarianism and democracy take off, the former to wipe it out and the latter to enrich it. But you wouldn’t know that from the democracy project proponents that equate normalization with democracy only.

In the old world of Habesha, when kings proclaim, “harestay hires, negaday niged”, it means the era of war and anarchy has come to an end and the rule of law has returned to the land. Mogos Tekeste, in his The Rule of Law in Eritrea makes an important distinction between two concepts of rule of law: the kind of rule of law that was practiced under Haile Selassie, where the government follows its own rules however wanting they are in respect to civil liberties and the advanced form of rule of law that we see in democratic nations where civil liberties are respected. Since the government of Eritrea doesn’t even follow its own rules, Mogos rightly puts it at the lowest wrung. Following this distinction, it is easy to see where “normalization” would belong. But if we look at the proponents of democracy, their message has been: “The only change that we want is of the advanced rule of law.” Well, may be they can afford the waiting, but the masses inside Eritrea don’t. For these proponents of democracy, if there is a way of getting normalization without democratization, they would have none of it, even it is meant to save the people from imminent existential threat! What is direly needed now is to get rid of the abnormal.

Don’t get me wrong: I am NOT against democracy; in fact, we should do all we can to get a democratic government. All I am saying is the horrendous humanitarian plight of the masses that needs an urgent resolution shouldn’t be held hostage by the “democracy project”. We should aim at the collapse of the Isaias regime without demanding a guarantee for a democratic transition. Besides the fact that no such guarantee will ever come however well prepared the opposition may get from the outside, almost any conceivable change would be able to stop the profuse bleeding of the nation that is taking place right now. If anything lesser can bring this tragedy into a quick end, so be it. That doesn’t mean we have to give up on democracy; it is just that in the order of importance, it comes second to the humanitarian plight of the masses that give us no time at all to act. That order of importance is first normalization, then democratization. If we can get both at the same time, well and good. But if we cannot; we shouldn’t be on the way of normalization just because we cannot guarantee democratization, even as we always work for the latter.

The democracy project, as now practiced by the opposition, has not only turned useless but pernicious. Although it is meant to accomplish a lot of tasks at the same time, not only is this ill-conceived democracy project incapable of doing any one of the jobs it is assigned to do, it also happens to be the most obstructive one, preventing many from seeking other means of removing the Isaias regime before it does irreparable and irreversible damage to the nation. Below, I will outline thirteen fallacies of the democracy project that happen to be both superfluous and obstructive to the task of regime change.

The superfluous and obstructive nature of the “democracy project”

The democracy project as embraced by many individuals, civic groups and political parties and as expounded in various writings, meetings, conferences and symposiums, is meant to do much heavy lifting:

1. to provide the only plausible explanation for the current humanitarian crisis in Eritrea: (The fallacy: “The present crisis in Eritrea is a result of the absence of democracy; or, the non-implementation of the constitution.”)
2. to most effectively bring the plight of Eritreans to the outside world’s attention: (The fallacy: “There is no better way to show the plight of Eritreans to the outside world than by pointing out the denial of their democratic rights.”)
3. to present itself as the only viable solution to the nation’s existential crisis: (The fallacy: “There is no other solution to the present existential crisis than through democracy; that is, democracy is necessarily needed to solve Eritrea’s existential problems.”)
4. to usher regime change entirely on its own merit: (The fallacy: “The democracy project is sufficient as a cause to bring regime change in Eritrea; it doesn’t require any other help.”)
5. to bring about the only desirable change: (The fallacy: “Even if there are other means to bring regime change, they are not desirable; the only better way is the democratic way.”)
6. to accomplish the delicate job of midwifing regime change at an appropriate timing: (The fallacy: “The democracy project is the only time sensitive project; it doesn’t rush change for the sake of change only” )
7. to necessarily connect change in Eritrea with peace in the region: (the fallacy: “Unless there is peace in the region, we cannot have the change we desire.”)
8. to present itself as an identifiable project when it is ready to go: (The fallacy: “There is a verifiable way of telling when the democracy project from the outside has done its preparations and gets ready.”)
9. to carry out the final goal of ghedli (hideri siwuatna): (The fallacy: “The democracy project is a logical continuation of the ghedli project.” – in the linguo of the hair-splitters, this would be “first netsanet, now ‘harnet.”)
10. to carry out the dream, wish or demand of the masses: (The fallacy: “It is the demand of the masses that there be democracy; or, that the constitution be implemented.”)
11. to work with democratic forces from within: (The fallacy: “The democracy project will have to work (or is working) in tandem with the democratic forces in Eritrea.”)
12. to facilitate the democratization process inside Eritrea from a distance: (the fallacy: “The democracy project from outside facilitates the democratization process inside Eritrea.”)
13. and to bring a lasting solution to the nation traumatized by decades of sectarian division: (The fallacy: “Democracy will bring a lasting solution to the nation’s recalcitrant problems; that is, democracy is the best way of keeping the nation together.”)

The democracy project, as now being practiced by the opposition, fails in every count mentioned above; and, in the process, it puts every hurdle imaginable to remove the Isaias regime at an appropriate time and save the masses from the horrendous existential crisis they find themselves trapped in.

Conclusion

As pointed above, it doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t emphasize democracy, but that we should be aware of its severe shortcomings when it comes to the task of facilitating regime change. If the democracy project has little, if ever, causal effect on the regime on Eritrea, then it should be entertained only as supplemental to the task of regime change. That is to say, it shouldn’t take a central place in the attempt of removing the Isaias regime from the seat of power, as it is being done now by the opposition. If we look carefully at every point the democracy project makes, it is directed not on how to bring regime change but on how to assure democracy after regime change. So it is primarily concerned with the takeover of the government once the regime falls and has nothing to do with the actual fall of the government itself. But many good-meaning Eritreans are being fooled; by fully immersing themselves in the democracy project, the worst of which has been the rallying around the constitution, they believe that they are doing the only thing needed to be done to bring about regime change in Eritrea. If so, the project is not only being simply superfluous but harmfully so.

In follow-up articles I will address all the thirteen fallacies of the democracy project mentioned above, with two main goals in mind: to show the superfluous (a better word would be “epiphenomenal”) nature of the democracy project, in that it never does what it sets out to do when it comes to the task of regime change given its causal impotency; and its obstructive nature, in that it has prevented well-meaning Eritreans from seeking alternative ways of finishing off the Isaias regime.

[I realize that I have started two threads, one on “Sanction Watch” and another one on “Democracy Project”. I will keep alternating between the two in my follow-up articles. Since both complement each other, I hope there won’t be any mix-ups.]

01/25/10

by Yosief Ghebrehiwet

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