Ethio-Romantics and the Politics of Military Intervention

"If you don't know your past, you don't know your future!" -- Bob Marley, the great Jamaican singer, song-writer, and celebrated revolutionary

The debate between those advocating for Ethiopian military intervention (the so-called “Ethiopian card”) and those who oppose such a move is a healthy debate. There is nothing wrong with debating the issues as long as the debate remains civil. It is in that spirit that I will attempt, once more, to add my opinion and concern in the following.

Those who advocate for Ethiopian military intervention in Eritrea, in my opinion, are as romantic as those whom they accuse of being "ghedli romantics". For the purpose of this article, I will call them Ethio-romantics. Ethio-romantics advocate for Ethiopian military intervention in Eritrea to remove the dictatorial regime of Isaias Afwerki. Ethio-romantics dream of the Ethiopian army sweeping through Eritrea and liberating the Eritrean people from the misery of the PFDJ regime. If that isn't hopelessly romantic, in the true sense of the word, I don't know what is! (Romantic: imaginative but impractical, not based on facts; imaginary).

Ethio-romantics assert, sanctimoniously, that the ghedli-romantics and others cautioning patience are obstructing them from, presumably, acting on their convictions. That is absurd. The idea that those who advocate for peaceful means of struggle or resistance are obstructing those advocating for military intervention by Ethiopia from acting is ridiculous indeed. And it certainly is a waste of time and energy of everyone involved. Contradistinction to their assertion, I would argue that the Ethio-romantics are the ones who are being obstructive by continually advocating for military intervention from Ethiopia, while other Eritreans are looking for a practical, workable strategy, one that forces strategic or even a mere tactical unity of the opposition first before moving or acting to remove the regime by all means necessary. One example is the on-going preparation for a second national congress searching for a common ground among the opposition. The problem with those advocating for the intervention by Ethiopia, the so-called Ethiopian card, is that while they denounce Ghedli and its aftermath, they now are calling for the same thing. That is to say, while denouncing romanticizing Ghedli, they, unwittingly and witlessly, as it were, are in turn romanticizing violence. Certainly, unless they are hallucinating, intervention by Ethiopia will not be bloodless; in fact, it will not be without great sacrifice. Ethiopia lost a few hundred soldiers in Somalia, a country in chaos with no standing army and/or government to speak of. Certainly, an Ethiopian military campaign in Eritrea would be much bloodier for Ethiopia than it was in Somalia. Melles, unlike our romantics, knows this better than anyone. Hence, I do not think he is willing to sacrifice thousands of Ethiopian troops again.

The Ethio-romantics are therefore dead wrong: first, Ethiopia does not appear to be willing to do our bidding (check PM Melles’ recent interview with Assenna.com’s Amanuel Iyasu). Nor would Ethiopia’s intervention, if it ever comes to pass, be without massive sacrifice. Secondly, and most crucially, "Power emanating from the barrel of the gun" (i.e., Ghedli), to borrow a socialist axiom, did not turn out to be power of or for the people but power for the very few -- dictator Isaias Afwerki and his opportunistic cronies. What makes people think now that ‘power emanating from the barrel of the gun’ (military intervention by Ethiopia and/or armed struggle by various groups without a coherent national strategy) would be any different? ‘Power emanating from the barrel of the gun’ failed to give us democracy, failed to give the poor, trusting Eritrean people even the right to vote. It is a sad fact that not even one national election has ever been held in Eritrea the last twenty years.

Throwing Caution to the Wind

Ethiopian military intervention might introduce another problem: nationalist sentiments and stiff opposition, giving the regime more support and ammunition. Mind you, not all Eritreans will accept invasion -- some might welcome it, others might not. And invasion will definitely strengthen the hand of the dictator and he would have a legitimate reason to rearm, recruit and mobilize the whole population, again. We know the police state in Eritrea is omnipresent and, therefore, it would be difficult to refuse its orders.

But I am not talking about pride here. I am talking about practical things. How in the world can you expect Ethiopia, a country that is not very far from a dictatorship itself, would remove the regime in Eritrea and install in its place a government of the people. I expect a puppet regime, but not a regime that would lead to democracy. But that apparently is not a concern of the Ethio-romantics. They don't seem to care what happens after the invasion as long as the dictator is gone. They don't seem to care what happens in the aftermath of Ethiopian invasion of Eritrea as long as the PFDJ government is removed from power. Sound familiar? It sounds like 1991 all over again! A puppet regime would be installed and Aseb might be bargained off. Ethio-romantics would then say "that's cool, Isaias is no more." Is that it? Is that what they are aspiring for? Throwing caution to the wind, YG ridicules patience. Patience has become a dirty word in the eyes of the Ethio-romantics, since they are so enamored with the idea of Ethiopia coming to our rescue.

The premise of the Ethio-romantics, as I said above, is, therefore, flawed. They assume (1) Ethiopia is willing to do our bidding and sacrifice thousands of its citizens in a bid to oust Isaias from power; (2) Ethiopia will install a democratic government, while Ethiopia itself is struggling if not with the idea of democracy but certainly with its implementation. Ethio-romantics' argument is based on the assumption of these two points. Let's put aside what would happen after that -- the day after or the aftermath Ethio-romantics are willing to ignore. The Ethiopian card is as remote as the Diaspora Eritreans returning to Eritrea to fight in order to remove the PFDJ regime. "ab semay zelo debena" (the cloud in the sky) is what we call in Tigrinya about such false hope. This is what Ethio-romantics are feeding the gullible -- false hope. In my book, that is called a waste of time and energy. Our energy should be spent on better things such as empowering, yes, empowering, educating and informing the people of Eritrea, and most importantly, telling the people the truth, not feeding them false hope of Manna from the sky, i.e., Ethiopia or any other military power coming to their rescue. No one is going to give the Eritrean people democracy, rule of law, and their human rights. They have to fight for it. Every time there is some news about Ethiopia, such as "Ethiopia warns Eritrea", etc., the Ethio-romantic's hope is raised to stratospheric levels; that the Ethiopian government might be considering an invasion after all, and they are elated.

But, here is a news report that would give any reasonable, cautious, and yes, patient person a pause: On March 23, 2011, that is this past week, a VOA news headline screamed "Ethiopia Accused Of Detaining Activists To Deter Uprising." The story goes on to say that, "Ethiopia has detained dozens of political activists...Oromo opposition leaders say as many as one hundred of their party members have been arrested in federal police sweeps over the past two weeks." (Read the article at VOAnews.com to see how Ethiopians in Ethiopia, not Asmarino-Ethiopians, feel about their government). Do we really want such a government to invade and intervene militarily in Eritrea? Or do Ethio-romantics even care about what the Ethiopian government does to its people as long as they get rid of our dictator for us? It reminds of the Kinijit folks and other Ethiopian opposition groups running to Asmara a few years back to embrace Isaias Afwerki, even though Kinijit knew Isaias was a dictator and knew also what Isaias was doing to Eritreans who oppose him. But they didn't care!

I know there is a sense of confusion in the younger generation. The latter asks many questions regarding the choices made by the older generations, including why "Ghedli" itself was necessary at all. They question the very wisdom of fighting the Eritrean Revolution. Looking at the Ethiopians, the young generation asks what the point of all that war and violence was. Especially to the Tigrigna, Tigrayan, or Kebessa Eritreans, they don't see the difference in culture, religion or history. These questions may take many different forms, but essentially they were similar to the series of articles Yosief wrote titled "Romanticizing Ghedli". In principle, I have no problem with Eritrea and Ethiopia coming closer together, forming a close relationship, or even reuniting again. But we have to keep in mind that that has to be with the consent of both peoples not a result of manipulations by political parties or governments.

In his article, "Public space in Eritrea: Lessons from the Egyptian uprising", Yosief writes, "I will argue why such a change is desirable even if it doesn’t guarantee democracy in its aftermath". That statement was really surprising to me coming from Yosief. Granted, Democracy is a process, not a one-time event. And overthrowing the government only ensures a new beginning; it doesn't guarantee democracy. But, planning for the future, for the aftermath will guarantee the path to democracy, and will start the process to democratization. As the great revolutionary Bob Marley, whose song lyric I quoted above says, if you don't know your past, you don't know your future. Our recent past should be instructive: that we have to be vigilant about and plan our future accordingly carefully.

Moreover, I thought the scathing criticism, the vilification of Ghedli, and the counter- or anti-Romanticizing dance Yosief performed in his "Romanticizing Ghedli" series of articles was aimed at criticizing the aftermath of Ghedli; that Ghedli was not planned well by its leaders and that Ghedli, therefore, ended up producing a dictator instead. What else did Yosief do in those articles except to regret our status quo -- the aftermath of the Ghedli -- and explain and criticize the lack of proper planning for the aftermath of the revolution? In that regard, here is what Yosief wrote in one of those articles excoriating the participants of Ghedli:

"Those who joined the revolution never asked what it would mean to the people's lives in terms of individual liberty, governance, rule of law, identity, destiny, legacy, prosperity, security, spirituality, creativity, fulfillment and happiness. But the problem is not simply that the ghedli generation didn't know what to do with independence once they achieved it but that they never knew what to ask prior to launching or joining the revolution" -See, "Eritrea: Fathers and sons and the Grammar of Independence."

Well, wasn't Yosief here attacking the Ghedli leaders (as well as the rank-and-file) for having no plans after independence, no plans for the aftermath? What makes Yosief think now change is necessary "… even if it doesn’t guarantee democracy in its aftermath"? How could we simply say, 'let's get rid of this regime first, then we'll think about it later?' Didn't we say that before as Yosief correctly diagnosed in the above-mentioned series of articles? Why, didn't we suffer for the past twenty years for neglecting to plan for the "aftermath"?

I think those who are advocating for military intervention are not using their heads; they are just going with their hearts.

Indeed, the end result, the aftermath, is as important if not more important than the process of getting there or the means to get there. Change for the sake of change is therefore dangerous. The danger is doubly so because there are no institutions in Eritrea except for the military that can take over in case there is a power vacuum. And we know for sure what happens when there is a power vacuum except for the military: the latter hijacks the people's revolution. Ethiopia's Dergue in September 1974 is but one example among many. The dictator in Eritrea has deliberately emasculated the institutions of government: the National Assembly, the Ministries, the Courts, and even the army. His Cabinet is just a token one, a joke really: they have no real power. The Ministries cannot decide anything on their own; even as far as the early nineties, the Ministries, and by extension, the Ministers referred important issues such budget to the Office of the President. They had no budgets; they had "mesarf" (monthly stipend) as if they were an army unit, as was the practice during the armed struggle. This is classic dictatorship and has nothing to do with ideology at all. It has everything to do with absolute control. The PFDJ is not a communist or socialist organization; it is a one-man dictatorship. Therefore, we certainly do not want to repeat the last twenty years.

I say this because some, even the supposedly more enlightened among us, tend to suggest that our plight, Eritreans' plight, is unique; that it is unprecedented. That is not true. Dictators are all the same; dictatorships are therefore all the same. All the dominoes falling in the "Arab Spring" we are witnessing everyday were run by brutal dictators -- Ben Ali, Mubarak, Gadhafi, Ali Saleh, Bashar of Syria, etc. They are trying to lift the state of emergency that prevailed in Syria for forty years. Egypt finally lifted after the fall of Mubarak the state of emergency implemented thirty years ago after the assassination of Anwar El Sadat. These regimes were as bad as, if not worse, than what we have in Eritrea today. So, the plight of the Eritrean people, although terrible, is not unique or unprecedented in history as some attempt to make it. Which reminds the other opposite: the PFDJ and its supporters belief that Eritrea and Eritreans are unique and special, which is equally false.

The Case of the G-15

There can be no denying the role of the G-15 to the internal opposition to the regime that erupted in 2001. The Eritrean people are grateful to the G-15 folks for their courage and ultimate sacrifice. They could have stayed silent like others in the government but they chose to speak up and have paid with their lives for it. That is the ultimate sacrifice.

However, Yosief equates the G-15 rebellion to the mass uprising of the peoples of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain and Yemen that we see today. There is no comparison whatsoever! In fact, the failure of the G-15 was their decision not to involve the public and not to go directly to the people of Eritrea and ask for the support of the Eritrean people. The evidence clearly shows that they had no intention whatsoever of involving the Eritrean people, let alone asking for their support, in their struggle against the tyrant. That was clear from their "Dear comrade" letters to Isaias Afwerki. It can also be seen from the main document they finally released, titled: "Open Letter to the members of the PFDJ". Notice it didn't say, "open letter to the Eritrean people", rather it was addressed to the members of the PFDJ. Hence, it is clear they wanted to solve it in the family -- the EPLF family. Only when the tyrant refused their plea did they turn to the public - giving interviews to the nascent independent media and exposing their previously private struggle with the dictator. As a result, I believe, they failed in their endeavor to change the course and direction of the country.

Furthermore, it seems Yosief has completely taken out of the equation the role of the people. While, the EDF is critical for several reasons in the struggle against the despot, the question should not be merely about the army but the people of Eritrea as a whole. The EDF is mostly part of the people; it is not part of the Ghedli generation, so to speak. And, therefore, when the time comes, the regime's divide and rule will unwittingly have allowed the EDF's majority rank-and-file to eventually take the side of the people. The question then should be: How do we give the Eritrean people the tools, the means to rebel, to stop fearing the regime, and start defying it and fighting it? What is our role as diaspora Eritreans in that regard? How do we empower the people of Eritrea? These are questions we have to answer.

We, in the diaspora, let's not kid ourselves for a minute and mislead the people inside Eritrea proper, are not going to do it for them either. The Eritrean people have to do it themselves. We need to get that message to the youth on the ground. They should not be looking for a change to come from the Diaspora or from a military intervention by the Weyane. Let us not deceive them and please let's not be sanctimonious. We, in the Diaspora, including the organized opposition, can only give the people at home moral and material support. Yes, the youth are fleeing. But for every thousand Eritreans who cross to the neighboring countries, there are tens of thousands still in the schools, in the villages, towns and cities. We in the diaspora can only support them from afar, because revolutions are not led from the Diaspora. They must be led from among the people on the ground. In my mind, there is no alternative for an uprising by the Eritrean people at some point, if genuine change is going to take place. And, yes, it takes sacrifice as well. I know. People will die, as hundreds of people are being killed right now in Libya. Three hundred plus were killed in Egypt. If anyone tells you that peaceful and non-violent resistance means there will be no sacrifice, no killing, or being killed, then either they are being naive or deceptive.

Therefore, as I wrote before regarding this thread, while I agree with Yosief and many readers of this website that the current situation in Eritrea is not suitable for non-violent resistance, it does not mean it will never be. If you disagree, then tell me why the revolutions we see now in North Africa and the Middle East did not happen a year ago, five years ago, or ten years ago? Why? The people of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria were not conscious of their persecution a year ago, ten years ago? Didn't know their rights? Or there was not Facebook or twitter? Think about it!

One final point: Yosief attempts to differentiate between the totalitarian and the authoritarian regimes. The Soviet Union, as we all know, was the most complete totalitarian regime. In fact, they wrote the book on that subject, literally and figuratively speaking. It's called Stalinism. The USSR was the mother of all dictatorships. But in 1990, the worst totalitarian regime the world ever saw was no match for the determined and principled resistance of the Russian people. Who can forget Boris Yelsin on top of an army tank, literally staring down the Soviet army? The Soviet Union was no more after that, its amalgam of Republics choosing independence and the giant menace dissolving into a dozen or so States at the end of the process. Note: in 1990 the Internet as we know it was at its infancy and, certainly, the social media of today, such as Facebook and Twitter, were yet to be invented.

In conclusion, I say the time will come when the Eritrean masses will also rise up and overthrow the regime, as the Eritrean people did in joining Ghedli and overthrowing the Dergue. It is only a matter of time. I believe this will happen; Yosief has not convinced me otherwise. And let us not pretend and feign ignorance that somehow some of us are being prevented from acting. No one is stopping anyone from doing what they want to do. Let's define what we want really, intervention militarily by the Weyane, or some pressure applied by our cousins to the south in the diplomatic, political, as well as military areas. We are probably confusing our friends by our ever splintering ways, both theoretically and organizationally. And finally, and most importantly, let's realize that the aftermath of a revolution, whichever form it takes, is as important as the means itself. Let’s not kid ourselves, the Aftermath, the Day After, is as important, if not more, as the means itself. And unless we plan for the day after, we will be doomed to repeat our history of the past two, three, or even five decades.